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The Simulation of Action Disorganisation 
in Complex Activities of Daily Living 
Richard P. Cooper, Myrna F. Schwartz, Peter Yule & Tim Shallice 
Action selection in everyday goal-directed tasks of moderate complexity is known to be subject to 
breakdown following extensive frontal brain injury. A model of action selection in such tasks is 
presented and used to explore three hypotheses concerning the origins of action disorganisation: 
that it is a consequence of reduced top-down excitation within a hierarchical action schema 
network coupled with increased bottom-up triggering of schemas from environmental sources, that 
it is a more general disturbance of schema activation modelled by excessive noise in the schema 
network, and that it results from a general disturbance of the triggering of schemas by object 
representations. Results suggest that the action disorganisation syndrome is best accounted for by a 
general disturbance to schema activation, while altering the balance between top-down and 
bottom-up activation provides an account of a related disorder – utilisation behaviour. It is further 
suggested that ideational apraxia (which may result from lesions to left temporoparietal areas and 
which has similar behavioural consequences to action disorganisation syndrome on tasks of 
moderate complexity) is a consequence of a generalised disturbance of the triggering of schemas 
by object representations. Several predictions regarding differences between action disorganisation 
syndrome and ideational apraxia that follow from this interpretation are detailed. 
1 Introduction 
Much human behaviour involves performing common tasks such as those relating to eating, dressing 
and commuting. Such activities of daily living (ADL) generally require little overt planning or 
problem solving, as is evidenced by the fact that it is frequently possible to complete a secondary task 
(e.g., holding a conversation) while engaged in the ADL. At the same time diary studies have shown 
that ADL are subject to occasional slips and lapses (e.g., Reason, 1979; Norman, 1981). Thus, after 
using milk to prepare a beverage one might unintentionally place the beverage, instead of the milk, in 
the refrigerator. Neurologically healthy individuals generally notice action lapses such as these, and 
spontaneously correct them. 
More severe disturbances in the execution of ADL may occur following brain injury. Luria (1966) 
noted that patients with extensive frontal lesions were prone to errors of action in simple tasks 
involving multiple steps and multiple objects. Luria reported patients who, when asked to light a 
candle, produced errors included perseverations (e.g., continuing to strike a match after it had been lit), 
object substitution errors (snapping the candle in two and discarding it after it had been lit, as if it were 
the match) and the “blending” of action sequences (e.g., attempting to “smoke” a candle after it had 
been lit). Many subsequent studies have highlighted the role of frontal involvement in “action 
disorganisation syndrome” (e.g., Duncan, 1986; Schwartz et al., 1991; Schwartz, et al., 1995; Sirigu, 
et al., 1996; Schwartz, et al., 1998; Humphreys & Forde, 1998). Thus, Schwartz et al. (1991) reported 
a patient with extensive bilateral frontal lesions who, when preparing coffee in a naturalistic setting, 
made errors such as putting breakfast cereal in the coffee mug (an object substitution error) and 
attempting to pour from the cream container before opening it (an anticipation/omission error). 
Working in a rather different tradition, research on so-called “ideational apraxia” (IA: Pick, 1905; 
Liepmann, 1920) has used “multiple object tasks” (De Renzi & Lucchelli, 1988) involving operations 
such as opening a can of soup with a can-opener or lighting a candle with a match. When performing 
such tasks, patients with left hemisphere lesions have been found to make errors including omission of 
component actions, misuse of objects, errors of sequence, mislocation of actions and general 
clumsiness (e.g., Poeck & Lehmkuhl, 1980; De Renzi & Lucchelli, 1988; Rumiati et al., 2001). Thus, 
when lighting a candle IA patients have been reported to fail to strike the match (action omission), 
bring the lit match to the candlestick rather than the candle (action mislocation), strike the match at the 
wrong end (object misuse), and strike the match before inserting the candle into the candlestick 
(sequence error). De Renzi & Lucchelli (1988) argued from behavioural evidence that IA was distinct 
from ideomotor apraxia and from neuroanatomical evidence that “the [left] temporoparietal junction 
represents the most frequent but not the unique anatomical correlate of IA” (p. 1183). They suggested 
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that the basic deficit was a result of “lack of access to a specific aspect of the semantic store” (p. 
1183), although classical ideational apraxia has also been attributed to a conceptual disturbance of the 
sequential organisation of actions (Poeck & Lehmkuhl, 1980) and a processing breakdown in top-
down excitation within a hierarchically structured interactive activation action control mechanism 
(Rumiati et al., 2001). 
Impairments of naturalistic action have also been observed in other patient groups. Schwartz et al. 
(1999), for example, presented data on the disorganisation of naturalistic action in a group of 30 
patients with right hemisphere lesions, including at least five whose lesions did not appear to extend 
into the frontal lobes, and Giovannetti et al. (2002) presented data from a group of 51 patients with 
mild to moderate dementia arising from various etiologies. Similar types of errors, including sequence 
errors, omission errors, action additions, and object substitution errors, were observed in both studies. 
Notwithstanding other differences between patient groups, there are striking similarities between the 
types of errors made by frontal patients as reported by Luria (1996) and Schwartz et al. (1991), those 
made by left temporoparietal patients as reported by De Renzi & Lucchelli (1988) and Rumiati et al. 
(2001), and those made by other patient groups. Indeed, Buxbaum et al. (1998: see also Giovannetti et 
al, 2002) demonstrated quantitative similarities between the error profiles of the various patient 
groups. On a range of semi-naturalistic ADL-type tasks (including making toast, wrapping a present, 
and preparing a packed lunch box), patients with lesions resulting from closed head injury primarily 
affecting frontal regions (CHI), left cardio-vascular accidents (LCVA), right cardio-vascular accidents 
(RCVA), and dementia of various aetiologies were all found to be most prone to omission errors. 
Sequence errors, including anticipation errors, perseverations, and action reversals, were the second 
most common error type in all groups. 
The similarities in the error profiles of different patient groups may be interpreted either as indicating 
a common functional deficit in the control of everyday activities (e.g., Schwartz et al., 1998; 1999; 
Giovannetti et al., 2002) or as indicating that the action control system is susceptible to a variety of 
different functional impairments which result in similar behavioural breakdown on semi-naturalistic 
ADL-type tasks (e.g., Buxbaum et al., 1998; Schwartz, 1995). The latter is also consistent with the 
variety of theoretical accounts of deficits in the control of everyday action that have been proposed 
within the various traditions. 
As noted above, De Renzi & Lucchelli (1988) attributed the action deficit of left temporoparietal 
patients to an access deficit: that part of the semantic store of object-related actions was hypothesised 
to be inaccessible in the course of everyday action. In contrast, Luria attributed the action deficit of 
patients with extensive frontal lesions to “the gross disintegration of the “preliminary synthesis” of 
intended actions and […] disturbances of the process of comparison of intention and effect” (Luria, 
1966, p. 238). Information processing theories of action selection suggest several further possible 
accounts of deficits in the control of everyday action following brain lesions. Norman & Shallice 
(1980, 1986), for example, proposed a dual-systems account of the control of thought and action. One 
system, contention scheduling, was held to be responsible for the control of routine behaviour. This 
system was argued to consist of a hierarchically structured network of action schemas, where an action 
schema represented the components of an action sequence in terms of other (lower-level) schemas or 
basic actions. Action schemas were held to compete for selection within an interactive activation 
network, with selected schemas exciting their component schemas and ultimately controlling action. It 
was proposed that action schemas would only be available within contention scheduling for routine 
situations. In non-routine situations, the functioning of contention scheduling would be modulated by 
a second system, supervisory attention. Supervisory attention was argued to be a function of the 
frontal lobes (Shallice, 1988). 
On the Norman & Shallice (1980, 1986) account, the behaviour of patients with extensive frontal 
lesions was suggested to result from the contention scheduling system functioning in the absence of 
adequate supervisory control (Shallice, 1988). However, Schwartz et al. (1991) pointed out that this 
could not account for the disorganised behaviour of frontal patients on routine tasks, as normal 
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functioning within such tasks should not require supervisory attention. Schwartz et al. (1991) 
proposed an alternative account based on the action disorganisation of their (predominantly frontal) 
patient, HH, namely that action was controlled by a single system of the same general form as the 
contention scheduling system of Norman & Shallice (1980, 1986), but without a distinction between 
routine and non-routine behaviours, and where disorganisation arose from an imbalance between top-
down or intentional control from schemas to their component schemas and bottom-up or 
environmental triggering of schemas from the immediate environment. 
Computational work has demonstrated that the Schwartz et al. (1991) view is consistent with the types 
of error that occur in the disorganised action of the various patient groups on everyday tasks (Cooper 
& Shallice, 2000), but there are a number of alternative theories of frontal function and dysfunction 
which may also be consistent with observed cases of action disorganisation. In fact, the Norman & 
Shallice (1980, 1986) dual-systems account of behavioural control is itself consistent with several of 
these theories. For example, Luria’s view of action disorganisation in frontal patients may be 
incorporated by accepting monitoring (i.e., processes involved in “the comparison of intention and 
effect”) as a component of supervisory attention (cf. Shallice, 1988; Shallice & Burgess, 1996). 
Other theories of frontal function stress the role of the frontal lobes in the storage and activation of 
“managerial knowledge units” to control behaviour over time (Grafman, 1989, 1995), in the on-line 
maintenance of representations in “working memory” (Goldman-Rakic, 1992; Kimberg & Farah, 
1993), or in the inhibition of inappropriate or undesirable behaviours (Fuster, 1997). The first of these, 
with a single hierarchical system for action control, is related to that outlined by Schwartz et al. 
(1991). The remaining two are broadly consistent with the Norman & Shallice account. Thus, Shallice 
& Burgess (1996) posit a mechanism within the supervisory system for the temporary elicitation of 
schemas without environmental support. Such schemas are held to govern supervised behaviour by 
modulation of the contention scheduling system; it is also assumed that they must be maintained in the 
supervisory system throughout their operation to ensure adequate behavioural control. Action 
disorganisation could result from failure to maintain temporary schemas, in keeping with the working 
memory view. (Again parallels may be drawn with Luria’s view by equating temporary schemas with 
the “preliminary synthesis of intended actions”.) 
The computational implementation of contention scheduling (Cooper & Shallice, 2000) facilitates the 
comparison of the above accounts of everyday action control and the various hypotheses concerning 
its breakdown following neural damage. However, the initial computational work was limited in scope 
– applying to the relative simple everyday task of preparing a mug of instant coffee – and provided 
only qualitative results. The purpose of this paper is therefore to extend the Cooper & Shallice (2000) 
model to more complex everyday tasks, to determine if the extended model is able to provide 
quantitative fits to the error patterns of the various patient groups, and to investigate the predictions of 
several theories of frontal breakdown and action disorganisation within the extended model.  
The remainder of the paper begins with a review and reanalysis of data gathered by Schwartz et al. 
(1998, 1999), Buxbaum et al. (1998), Humphreys & Forde (1998) and Forde & Humphreys (2002). 
The extended model is then presented, together with its relation to the earlier model of Cooper & 
Shallice (2000). We demonstrate that the revised model can account for normal behaviour on the task 
of preparing and packing a lunchbox and evaluate three competing hypotheses concerning the origins 
of action disorganisation. The first, reduced top-down excitation within the schema hierarchy, derives 
from previous work concerning the relation between the CS/SAS theory and action disorganisation, 
both in patients (Schwartz et al., 1991) and the earlier version of the model (Cooper & Shallice, 2000). 
The second, increased noise disrupting the flow of activation within the schema network, is considered 
because neurological evidence suggests that action disorganisation can result from generalised, rather 
than localised, damage. A number of previous models in a range of domains (e.g., Hinton & Shallice, 
1991; Plaut & Shallice, 1993; Houghton, Glasspool & Shallice, 1994; Plaut, McClelland, Seidenberg 
& Patterson, 1996; Rapp & Goldrick, 2000; Botvinick & Plaut, 2004) have employed increased noise 
to model general effects of brain damage. Here it is used to model a generalised deficit within one 
functional subcomponent of the model – the schema network. A third hypothesis, a general 
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disturbance of object representations, is also considered because of the close relationship between 
schemas and object representations within the model. 
To foreshadow, the conclusions are that action disorganisation as seen in frontal patients is best 
accounted for by a general disturbance to schema activation, while altering the balance between top-
down and bottom-up sources of schema activation provides an account of utilisation behaviour 
(Lhermitte, 1983; Shallice et al., 1989; Boccardi et al., 2002), a distinct disorder arising from bilateral 
medial frontal lesions. From a behavioural perspective, ideational apraxia might also be accounted for 
by a general disturbance of schema activation, but simulation results suggest an alternative that is 
consistent with both behavioural and neuroanatomical evidence – that ideational apraxia might result 
from a generalised disturbance of the triggering of schemas by object representations. Several 
predictions that follow from this alternative are discussed. 
2 Action Disorganisation Syndrome: Key Empirical Findings 
The studies of Schwartz, Buxbaum and colleagues and Humphreys and Forde have isolated a number 
of key empirical findings against which theoretical and computational accounts of action 
disorganisation may be evaluated. In very broad terms, errors of action may be subdivided into errors 
of omission (i.e., errors resulting from failing to initiate some task-essential action or sequence of 
actions) and errors of commission (i.e., errors resulting from initiating an action that is in some way 
incorrect or inappropriate). Commission errors may be further subdivided into sequence errors (where 
correct actions are performed but in incorrect sequential order); object substitutions (where an 
inappropriate object is used in place of an available appropriate object); and action additions (where 
extraneous unrelated actions are introduced into an ongoing activity). Sequence errors may themselves 
be further decomposed into anticipation/omission errors (performing action2 before action1 and 
subsequently omitting action1 when action1 should have preceded action2), reversal errors (performing 
two consecutive actions in reverse order), and perseverations (repeating an action or action sequence 
once its goal has been achieved). This taxonomy is summarised with examples from the task of 
packing a lunch box (as used by Schwartz and colleagues, and as described below) in Table 1.  
Table 1: Summary of error taxonomy. Examples are drawn from the task of preparing a 
sandwich, snack and drink and packing the three items into a lunch box, as used with 
various patient groups by Schwartz et al. (1998, 1999) and Buxbaum et al. (1998). 
Error Type Examples 
Step omission Failure to pack cookies, sandwich or drink into the lunch box 
Failure to include filling when making the sandwich 
Sequence: 
    Anticipation/Omission 
Packing the sandwich without first wrapping it in foil 
Attempting to pour from the juice jar without first opening it 
Sequence: 
    Reversal 
Packing the cookies or sandwich and then wrapping them 
Placing cookies or sandwich on foil before tearing foil from roll 
Sequence: 
    Perseveration 
Taking more than two slices of bread for the sandwich 
Wrapping the cookies or sandwich more than once 
Object substitution Packing the lunch items into the schoolbag instead of the lunch box 
Using apple sauce instead of mustard on the sandwich 
Action addition Eating the sandwich or the cookies 
Packing inappropriate items (e.g., the mustard jar) into the lunch box
 
Patients additionally produce errors of manner or quality, such as using excessive quantities of 
ingredients, failing to use tools, or using appropriate tools inappropriately. These errors were relatively 
rare in the groups observed by Schwartz and colleagues, and we do not discuss them further here. 
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2.1 The relative proportions of error types 
Schwartz et al. (1998) found that the most common type of error produced by their CHI patients was 
that of the omission of a step. Such errors accounted for 38% of all errors. Sequence errors were the 
second most frequent error type accounting for an additional 20% of errors. Humphreys & Forde 
(1998) found a similar tendency towards omission and sequence errors. They observed 34% omissions 
errors and 40% sequence errors in their case studies of two patients with extensive frontal lesions 
(averaging over their experiments 2a and 2b).1 In both studies the two other principal error types, 
object substitution and action addition errors, accounted for approximately 10% of errors each. 
Different tasks offer different possibilities for error, and it is possible that the relative proportions of 
errors of patients reflect an effect of task rather than an effect of damage to the mechanisms involved 
in action selection. Schwartz et al. (1998) explored this possibility by converting error frequencies to 
standardised error scores. A patient’s standardised error score for any type of error is defined as the 
total number of errors of that type produced on a task, divided by the total number of opportunities 
provided by the task for that error type, multiplied by 100. Thus, a standardised omission error score 
of 4, for example, would result if a patient were to make 4 omission errors per 100 opportunities. 
Figure 1, adapted from Schwartz et al. (1998), shows the standardised scores for omission, sequence 
and object substitution errors produced by their 30 CHI patients. The preponderance of omission 
errors is clear, and while the relative proportion of sequence errors is reduced, such errors remain 
second most frequent.  
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
Further studies by Schwartz, Buxbaum and colleagues on other patient groups have demonstrated 
similar error profiles. Buxbaum et al. (1998), for example, found 44% omission errors and 27% 
sequence errors in the error corpus produced by 16 LCVA patients performing a set of ADL tasks, and 
Schwartz et al. (1999) found 47% omission errors and 19% sequence errors in a comparable corpus of 
errors derived from 30 RCVA patients. These data, together with that of Schwartz et al. (1998) and 
Humphreys and Forde (1998), suggest that the system or systems responsible for the control of ADL-
type tasks is/are particularly prone to omission errors, with sequence errors second most frequent, and 
object substitution errors and action additions possible but less likely.  
2.2 The relative proportions of commission and omission errors as a function of severity 
Schwartz et al. (1998) noted that omission errors were particularly common in the behaviour of their 
more severe patients (where severity was defined in terms of the total error score across a range of 
everyday tasks under a variety of conditions). This is clear from Figure 1, but the effect is also present 
in the errors of LCVA and RCVA patients. Table 2, which is based on a reanalysis of the data reported 
by Schwartz et al. (1998, 1999) and Buxbaum et al. (1998) quantifies the effect. The table shows the 
mean total standardised error scores and the mean “standardised commission proportion” for low and 
high error producers for each patient group. The standardised commission proportion for a patient is 
defined as the fraction of standardised commission errors to total standardised errors. The data in the 
table are derived from each patient performing two of three ADL tasks (preparing and packing a lunch 
box, preparing toast with jam, and wrapping a gift), one with just the items needed for the task, and 
one with additional “distractor” items available while completing the task. Patients who produced no 
errors are excluded from the analysis. The mean standardised commission proportion for all three 
patient groups is significantly higher for low error producers than for high error producers (t(13) = 4.2, 
p < 0.001, t(12) = 17.9, p < 0.001, t(22) = 5.7, p < 0.001 for the CHI, LCVA and RCVA samples 
respectively). In other words, in all patient groups low error producers tended to produce more 
commission errors, while high error producers tended to produce more omission errors. 
                                                     
1More than half of the sequence errors observed by Humphreys & Forde (1998) were perseverations, but such 
errors were rare in the Schwartz et al. (1998) study. Further differences between the patient profiles in the two 
studies are noted below. 
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Table 2. The standardised error rates and standardised commission proportions for three 
patient groups. The data are grouped according to a median split on total error scores. 
Patients who produced no errors were excluded from the analysis.  
Group N 
Mean 
standardised 
omission 
errors 
Mean 
standardised 
commission 
errors 
Mean 
total 
standardised 
errors 
Mean  
standardised 
commission 
proportion 
CHI low E 8 2.357 3.148 5.506 0.801 
CHI high E 7 27.119 4.966 32.085 0.180 
LCVA low E 7 0.000 2.365 2.365 1.000 
LCVA high E 7 23.857 3.199 27.057 0.136 
RCVA low E 12 3.122 3.434 6.555 0.808 
RCVA high E 12 39.315 6.846 46.160 0.186 
 
2.3 Accomplishment and its correlation with the principal error types 
Schwartz et al. (1998) also scored behaviour on a single accomplishment dimension that reflected the 
percentage of subtasks of the ADL that each participant completed, ignoring errors along the way. For 
example, the task or preparing and packing a lunch box (as described below) involved six subtasks. A 
participant who successfully completed five out of the six subtasks would obtain an accomplishment 
score of 83.3%. Unsurprisingly there was a strong negative correlation between total error score and 
accomplishment (r = –0.918, p < 0.001). However, there was also a strong negative correlation 
between the number of commission errors and accomplishment score (r = –0.771, p < 0.001). Thus, 
CHI patients with low accomplishment scores also tended to produce more errors of commission than 
CHI patients with higher accomplishment scores.  
2.4 The effects of distractor objects 
Schwartz, Buxbaum and colleagues also investigated the effect of the absence or presence of distractor 
objects on ADL performance. In one condition participants were required to complete an ADL task 
while seated at a desk with all and only those items required for the task present on the desk. In a 
second condition, participants were supplied with several additional items that were not needed for the 
task (e.g., a spatula as well as a butter knife). There was no significant effect of the presence of 
distractors on total errors in CHI, LCVA and RCVA populations. However, when error types were 
analysed separately and corrected to account for differential opportunities across tasks and conditions, 
all populations showed a trend towards more omission errors and more object substitutions in the 
presence of distractor objects. Furthermore, when the data from the three groups were analysed as one, 
the increase in omissions was significant. The trend towards more object substitutions remained, but 
did not reach significance.2 This pattern of results was not predicted (either from existing theory or 
from existing models). In particular, while some theoretical positions might suggest that the presence 
of distractor objects should lead to an increase in object substitution errors, the observed increase in 
omission errors was surprising.  
Further replication of the distractor effect is desirable. Two case studies (patients FK and HG) reported 
by Humphreys & Forde (1998) showed no overall effect of distractors on total error rates. While it is 
possible that this may be due to the small sample size (two) of Humphreys & Forde (1988), it may 
equally reflect a different pattern of impairment in the Humphreys and Forde patients. Weight is added 
to this latter interpretation by the fact that many of the errors produced by the patients of Humphreys 
& Forde (1998) were of the perseverative type, while few such errors were observed in the group 
studies of Schwartz, Buxbaum and colleagues.  
                                                     
2However, a group study of patients with progressive dementia, which employed the methods and materials of 
the Schwartz group, did find a significant increase in substitution errors in the condition with distractors 
(Giovannetti et al., 2002). 
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3 A Model of Action Selection in Complex Activities of Daily Living 
The above empirical findings provide a set of phenomena against which models of action selection in 
ADL and accounts of ADL action selection deficits may be evaluated. Two models have been 
published – the implementation of contention scheduling within an interactive activation framework 
by Cooper & Shallice (2000; see also Cooper et al. 1995) and the recurrent connectionist model of 
Botvinick & Plaut (2002, 2004). Both of these models address only simple ADL with relatively few 
subtasks. Thus, the coffee preparation task modelled by Cooper & Shallice (2000) and subsequently 
used by Botvinick & Plaut involved three subtasks (adding sugar, milk and coffee grounds to a mug of 
boiling water) and 12 actions. This section describes an extended version of the Cooper & Shallice 
(2000) model, its relation to the original model, and its application to a more complex ADL task, that 
of preparing a packed lunch. The task is more complex than the coffee preparation task because a) it 
requires many more basic actions (approximately 60 compared to 12); b) the hierarchical structuring 
between the top-most schema and its basic-level component schemas is substantially greater 
(involving up to five levels compared to three); c) the constraints governing ordering of sub-tasks are 
more complex (the complete task as encoded within the model comprises seven subtasks in which 
different elements are prepared and packed, and interleaving of some subtasks is possible); and d) it 
offers the possibility of running subtasks together (e.g., preparing and then packing a drink, without 
relinquishing control of the drink container between subtasks). 
3.1 The basic level 
We assume that there exist control units corresponding to “basic-level” action schemas such as pick 
up, put down, open, close, etc., and that these control units or nodes compete within an interactive 
activation network according to standard principles (e.g., McClelland, 1992). Thus, nodes have 
associated activation levels that are influenced by self excitation and lateral inhibition. Self influence 
encourages nodes to become active, while lateral influence from “competing” nodes acts against self 
influence. The net effect of these influences is that only one node from any subset of competing nodes 
may be highly active at a time. Competition within the basic-level is restricted to nodes corresponding 
to schemas that have overlapping resource requirements, where resources include special purpose 
processing subsystems (e.g., relating to linguistic or visuospatial processing) and effectors. This 
ensures that nodes corresponding to schemas that share such requirements cannot become active 
simultaneously. Thus, two nodes corresponding to basic-level schemas that both require use of the 
hands cannot be active at the same time, though two nodes corresponding to schemas requiring 
different resources (e.g., manual and vocal resources) may. Competition is normalised so that the total 
lateral inhibition on a node is divided by the number of competitors of that node. Consequently, 
schemas with many competitors are not at a disadvantage compared with schemas with few 
competitors. 
It is also assumed that a similar network exists for object representations, with nodes in the object 
representation network corresponding to the objects present in the immediate environment. Nodes 
within the object representation network afford actions by triggering or exciting nodes within the 
schema network, and vice versa. Thus, a small portable object in view may lead to triggering of the 
node for the basic-level pick up action schema. Links between the object representation network and 
the schema network are bi-directional and symmetric, so the object representation node for a small 
portable object in view will also be triggered or excited by that for the basic-level pick up schema. In 
principle, other influences (e.g., from the supervisory attentional system) may act upon nodes in the 
object representation network, but we do not consider such influences in the current model. 
Actions corresponding to basic level schemas may involve multiple objects. Thus, pouring involves 
use of one object as a source and another object as a target. We therefore assume that there are distinct 
object representation networks for distinct functional roles (e.g., source, target, implement, theme). 
We also assume that resources (e.g., the hand to use to effect an action) are allocated through a further 
interactive activation network, whose nodes correspond to available resources. The application of the 
model described here does not involve use of resources beyond two hands. We therefore do not 
consider this network in further detail. 
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Action selection occurs when a schema node’s activation exceeds the selection threshold, which is a 
parameter of the model. This may occur because of the effects of competition, excitation from the 
object representation network, and/or through top-down excitation from source schemas (as described 
below). The action corresponding to the selected schema node (e.g., pick up) is then performed, with 
the object on which it is performed determined by the functional role specified by the schema (e.g., 
source or target) and the activation of nodes in the relevant object representation network, and the 
effector(s) used to perform the action determined by the requirements of the action (whether a free 
hand or a full hand is required) and the activation of nodes in the resource/effector network. Once an 
action has been performed, its corresponding schema node is inhibited, allowing other schema nodes 
to become active through the dynamics of interactive activation. 
The interaction between the schema network and the object representation network begins to provide 
an account for simple utilisation behaviours (Lhermitte, 1983; Shallice et al., 1989). There is positive 
feedback between the two networks and if this goes unchecked it may lead to an object representation 
node and a corresponding schema node becoming highly active. Selection will then result in the 
corresponding action being applied to the object. Because object representations trigger only those 
schemas that are appropriate to them (and vice versa), the action performed will be an object-
appropriate one. 
3.2 The schema hierarchy 
The basic-level system as described in the previous section is able to perform sequences of action 
through successive activation of schema nodes. However, it lacks high-level organisation in its action. 
In order to provide for such organisation we assume that the schema network also includes control 
nodes for higher level schemas corresponding to partially ordered sets of lower level and basic-level 
action schema nodes. The network may include, for example, a node for the control of an intermediate 
level act such as capping a thermos flask, comprising nodes for picking up two objects (a thermos and 
its corresponding cup), clipping the cup onto the thermos, and putting down the capped thermos. 
Similarly, the network may include higher level action schemas (such as preparing a sandwich), which 
comprise multiple intermediate level schemas.3 High level schema nodes may, like basic-level schema 
nodes, activate, and be activated by, object representation nodes. 
The addition of hierarchical structure in the model is motivated in part by the existence of such 
structure within and between many tasks. Thus, it is natural to describe the first step of tea-preparation 
as boiling the kettle, and the first step of boiling the kettle as checking the water level in the kettle. In 
addition the subtask of boiling the kettle is shared with a number of drink-related tasks (e.g., preparing 
instant coffee and instant soup). Hierarchical structuring is also an integral part of the original verbal 
specification of the contention scheduling theory (Norman & Shallice, 1980, 1986), and receives 
empirical support from the nature of errors in action disorganisation (which include omission and 
repetition of entire subtasks: Schwartz et al., 1991). The cost of hierarchical structuring, however, is 
the requirement for mechanisms controlling competition, selection and deselection of high-level 
schemas, and for mechanisms controlling the sequencing of component schemas within high-level 
schemas. 
We assume that two high level schemas compete if and only if they share component schemas and one 
is not a component (or sub-component) of the other. This definition (which is simpler than that of 
Cooper & Shallice, 2000) is a restatement of that proposed by Norman & Shallice (1980, 1986). In 
addition, we assume that selection of high-level schemas parallels that of low-level schemas: high-
                                                     
3As in the original model, schemas are goal directed and specify a set of subgoals, rather than a set of sub-
schemas. The distinction only plays a role when multiple schemas co-exist for a single goal, as for the goal of 
opening a container, which may be achieved by different schemas depending on the type of container. Such 
schemas compete, with competition normally being resolved through activation from the representation of the 
environment. Thus, in the case of opening a container, schema selection will be determined by bottom-up factors 
(the type of container that is actually held) rather than top-down expectations (the type of container that should 
be held given the task). See Cooper & Shallice (2000) for additional details. 
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level schemas are selected when the activation of their control nodes exceeds the selection threshold. 
Following Norman & Shallice (1980, 1986), high level schemas are deselected when their activation is 
exceeded by that of a competitor. 
To illustrate, Figure 2 shows the activation of various task-relevant schemas during completion of an 
ADL – pouring a drink into a thermos and sealing the thermos. Time is represented on the horizontal 
axis. The hierarchical structuring within the schema network leads to “temporal nesting” of activation 
profiles (cf. Dehaene & Changeux, 1997), whereby component schemas are activated, selected and 
deselected within a temporal window defined by the selection of their higher-level parent schema. 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
It is assumed that supervisory processes may directly excite or inhibit schemas at any point in the 
hierarchy. Sufficient excitation will result in selection of a high level schema. Selected schemas excite 
their component schemas, which may also become selected and excite their component schemas. 
Activation may therefore flow in a top-down manner within the schema network. Ultimately this 
activation flow and selection bottoms-out at the basic level, an action is performed, and the selected 
basic-level schema is inhibited, allowing further actions to be performed. If the action results in the 
goal of a higher-level schema being achieved, then the higher-level schema is also inhibited, allowing 
another (competing) schema at the higher level to become active and be selected. 
When a schema is selected it does not necessarily excite all of its component schemas. Such excitation 
would not guarantee task-appropriate temporal ordering of component schemas. Instead, excitation of 
component schemas is gated by pre-conditions and post-conditions. Specifically, a component schema 
node only receives excitation from a selected parent schema node if its pre-condition is satisfied by the 
representation of the state of the environment and its post-condition is not. A final inhibitory 
mechanism acts upon a selected schema’s node when the post-conditions of all of its component 
schemas have been satisfied. This inhibits the selected schema node until the node is deselected. 
Together, these mechanisms provide the system with substantial flexibility. If, for example, a 
component schema’s post-conditions are satisfied by a fortuitous state of the task environment (e.g., if 
the someone has left the milk open) then the component schema will not receive top-down excitation 
(and action will proceed without attempting to open the already opened milk container). 
3.3 Object binding 
The model as described to this point is capable of much if not all of the behavioural flexibility required 
when performing sequential ADL of significant complexity. Neuropsychological evidence suggests, 
however, a further refinement. On one occasion when preparing instant coffee patient HH (reported in 
Schwartz et al., 1991) carried out the entire task using the cereal bowl, rather than the coffee mug, as 
the destination for the coffee ingredients. The most parsimonious account of HH’s behaviour is that he 
made one object substitution error in mis-identifying the destination for coffee preparation, rather than 
one object substitution error each time an ingredient was added to the destination. 
This analysis suggests that objects may be bound to functional roles at high levels in the schema 
hierarchy, and not just at the basic level. It is therefore assumed that when an object representation is 
selected to fill an argument role of an action corresponding to a basic-level schema the object 
representation may also be bound to a functional role specified by a higher-level schema. This form of 
object binding ensures coherence of actions within high-level schemas. To illustrate, a high level 
schema for make sandwich may be specified as binding a target for the sandwich (hopefully a slice of 
bread), but not a theme (which will vary as different items are placed on the target slice). When make 
sandwich is selected, the schema’s target will be bound to the target of the first relevant action (e.g., 
the slice of bread to which the mustard is applied, assuming mustard is the first thing put on the 
bread). Subsequent actions within the scope of the make sandwich schema will use the same target – 
so the meat and the second slice of bread will be placed on the same slice of bread used for the 
mustard – until make sandwich is deselected and the target functional role is unbound. 
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When a representation of an object is unbound from a functional role the representation’s node is 
inhibited, mirroring the inhibition of schema nodes upon deselection. As in the schema network, this 
inhibition continues until the activation of the deselected object representation is exceeded by that of a 
competitor. 
3.4 Monitoring and error correction 
The use of pre-conditions and post-conditions to modulate the top-down flow of activation within the 
schema hierarchy opens up the possibility of augmenting the basic contention scheduling system with 
mechanisms for monitoring and error correction. A high-level schema (such as filling and sealing a 
thermos) will have a post-condition and a set of component schemas. Each component schema will 
likewise have a post-condition. Under “correct” functioning the post-condition of a higher level 
schema should be satisfied when all component schemas are completed (or their post-conditions are 
otherwise satisfied). The extended model therefore also includes a monitoring mechanism that tests a 
schema’s post-condition whenever a schema is deselected. If the post-condition is not satisfied, an 
error correction mechanism is invoked. In general, error correction may involve complex reasoning or 
problem solving and within the general supervisory system/contention scheduling framework the net 
effect of these processes would be to selectively excite or inhibit appropriate nodes within the schema 
network. Such complex and potentially open-ended processes have not been implemented. Rather, the 
simulations reported here adopt a greatly simplified approach to error correction, namely reactivating 
the failed schema. This simplified approach has proved to be highly effective in the restricted domains 
discussed below. 
Monitoring and error correction may be considered as rudimentary supervisory processes. Under ideal 
conditions and as described below the basic model is able to simulate error-free behaviour in tasks of 
moderate complexity without calling upon these processes. They are only required to get behaviour 
back on track following error. They are therefore important for simulating extended sequences of 
errorful behaviour, such as that of frontal patients performing complex activities of daily living, 
because while such patients may make numerous errors, they nevertheless appear to continue “on 
task” following those errors. 
3.5 On the relation between the current model and that of Cooper & Shallice (2000) 
There are five main differences between the model reported here and that presented by Cooper & 
Shallice (2000). Three of these – the use of pre-conditions and post-conditions to gate the top-down 
flow of excitation within the schema network, the binding of objects within higher-level schemas, and 
the use of monitoring/error correction – have clear theoretical motivations and implications. The 
remaining two – the definition and subsequent normalisation of competition – are more 
implementational in nature. They are motivated by computational demands imposed upon the 
propagation of activation by the additional complexity of tasks such as the lunch packing task, and are 
not discussed further. Appendix C contains a detailed, assumption-by-assumption, list of differences 
between the models. 
The rationales for object binding and monitoring/error correction have already been discussed, but the 
use of pre-conditions and post-conditions warrants further discussion. Within the earlier version of the 
model a schema’s specification included a partially ordered set of subgoals necessary for successful 
completion of the schema. When a high level schema was selected, activation was passed to all 
component schemas that could achieve relevant subgoals. Execution of a schema was assumed to 
require successful completion of one component schema for each of the selected schema’s subgoals. 
This is satisfactory only in the simplest of domains, when successful completion of all subgoals is 
necessary and sufficient for successful completion of a schema and when subgoals cannot fail. The 
requirements of more complex ADL suggest that this treatment of goals is a considerable 
simplification. The current model therefore extends subgoals to incorporate pre-conditions and post-
conditions. Pre-conditions ensure that top-down excitation is not normally passed to a component 
schema until it is potentially relevant. Post-conditions provide additional flexibility in determining 
which subgoals of a selected schema are essential to the schema’s successful completion. Together, 
these mechanisms yield a system with considerable flexibility in behaviour. For example, component 
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schemas may be effectively concatenated, such that actions that conceptually belong at the end of one 
schema (e.g., discarding a spoon after it has been used to add sugar to a beverage) may be omitted 
when they are not required for the successful completion of a subsequent schema (e.g., stirring the 
beverage). Thus, at a theoretical level, the use of pre-conditions and post-conditions allows schemas, 
as abstractions, to apply in a wide range of situations. The earlier model would require separate 
schemas, for example, when preparing coffee with a sealed coffee jar and with an open coffee jar 
(differing only in the component schema for opening the coffee jar), or for stirring coffee when 
already holding a teaspoon and when not holding a teaspoon. Within the current model each case 
requires a single schema. 
3.6 An instantiation of the model: The lunch packing task 
In order to evaluate the extended model it is necessary to consider its instantiation in a specific task. 
The task considered here, preparing and packing a lunchbox, is one for which considerable empirical 
data (from normals and neurological patients) is available (cf. Schwartz, et al., 1998, 1999; Buxbaum, 
et al., 1998). The lunch packing task has six subtasks: wrap a snack, prepare and then wrap a 
sandwich, fill and then seal a thermos, and finally pack the prepared items into the lunchbox. Each 
subtask has a number of steps, many of which may themselves be further decomposed (e.g., applying 
mustard to the bread while making the sandwich involves picking up and opening a mustard jar). 
Control subjects perform the six subtasks in a variety of orders and with some interleaving of 
preparation and pack operations. They also make sporadic action slips such as attempting to screw the 
juice jar lid onto the mustard jar. 
An appropriate schema hierarchy was developed for the complete task based on a standardised 
decomposition of each subtask. A fragment off the hierarchy is shown in Figure 3, and a complete 
listing of schemas is given in Appendix A. The schema hierarchy was complemented with an object 
representation network comprising nodes for the fifteen objects used by Schwartz, Buxbaum and 
colleagues in their “with distractor items” condition. Each object was represented by a set of features 
relating to, for example, size and shape. (See Appendix B for a complete list of objects and their 
features.) These features determined both how the objects behaved when they were acted upon, and 
the extent to which objects triggered (and were triggered by) schemas. 
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE 
3.7 Model behaviour in the lunch packing task 
The model’s behaviour is strongly dependent on the relative flow of activation within and between the 
various interactive activation networks. Four parameters control activation flow within the schema 
network: SS (degree of self influence), LS (degree of lateral influence), IS (degree of intrinsic, or 
schema-to-schema, influence), and ES (degree of extrinsic, or object-to-schema, influence). Similar 
parameters control activation flow within and between the other networks, with the subscript S, O and 
R used to indicate schema, object representation, and resource network parameters respectively. In 
addition, the impact of activation on any node within each network is subject to normally distributed 
random noise. The standard deviation of the noise distribution is given by the noise parameter, N. A 
further parameter, P, controls the degree to which activation of nodes persists from cycle to cycle in 
the absence of other influences. (See McClelland (1992) for further details of self, lateral, and noise 
parameters in interacting activation networks. See Cooper & Shallice (2000) and Cooper et al. (1995) 
for details of how individual parameters impact upon activation flow within the interactive activation 
action selection model, and Cooper & Shallice (1997) for discussion of the stability of the original 
model with respect to the various parameters.) 
A number of simulations were performed at various points in parameter space in order to determine 
appropriate values for the simulation of well-structured behaviour. When SS = 0.23, LS = 0.46, IS = 
0.50, ES = 0.10, P = 0.87 and 0.00 < N ≤ 0.01, the model is able to perform the complete task 
(approximately 60 actions) without error. Figure 4 shows a segment of well-formed behaviour from 
this region of parameter space. Departing from this region of the parameter space (e.g., increasing 
noise to 0.02 or greater) results in occasional errors similar in frequency and character to those of 
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control participants. Figure 5 shows a segment containing one such error (an object substitution error, 
occurring with N = 0.04). Here, the model performed normally for most of the task, but then 
incorrectly packed the wrapped snack into the lunch box lid, instead of the lunch box. Subsequent 
items were correctly packed.4 The error occurred because noise affecting object representations led to 
the lunch box lid being active as a target during the initial packing operation. 
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE 
INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE 
Action scripts generated by the model (such as those in Figures 4 and 5) were scored by a separate 
program which automated the scoring procedure developed by Schwartz, Buxbaum and colleagues for 
scoring patient behaviour on the lunch packing task. The procedure differentiates between the types of 
error shown in Table 1, and produces a standardised error score for each type of error and an 
accomplishment score for the entire task.  
Once reasonable “default” parameter values had been determined, large regions of the parameter space 
were scanned in order to determine the sensitivity of the model to the values of the various parameters. 
In this, and all parameter studies reported here, the Express software (Yule & Cooper, 2001, 2003) 
was used for the co-ordination of simulations across a set of networked machines and for the collation 
and preliminary analysis of simulation results. 
Figure 6 (left) shows the error surface obtained by averaging total errors produced over 20 trials for 
each parameter value, with S and L fixed (at 0.23 and 0.46 respectively) and with IS and ES varying 
between zero and one. The number of errors is indicated by the greyscale, with white corresponding to 
zero errors. There is a substantial region of roughly triangular shape on the left of the graph in which 
few errors occur (with IS ranging from 0.35 to 0.80 and ES ranging from 0.05 to 0.25), indicating that 
in the stable region the model is robust to changes in these parameters. Figure 6 (right) shows 
accomplishment scores for the same region of parameter space. High accomplishment scores are 
shown by lighter shades of grey. The error-free region is clearly also a region of high accomplishment 
(i.e., where the task is generally successfully completed), but as in both control data and patient data, 
high accomplishment scores do not correlate perfectly with low error scores – accomplishment scores 
may be very low despite moderate error production, in cases where the errors are mostly of the 
omission type, and commission errors of all types may contribute to an error score without 
compromising the accomplishment score.  
INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE 
Figure 7 (left) shows a second error surface, obtained by fixing IS and ES (at 0.50 and 0.10 
respectively) and varying S and L (simultaneously within all networks) from 0.00 to 1.00. 
Corresponding accomplishment scores are shown in Figure 7 (right). Again, there is a substantial area 
in which few errors occur. Although the self influence parameter is quite highly constrained, the figure 
indicates that (at least in this region of the parameter space) the model is robust to changes in the 
lateral influence parameter.  
INSERT FIGURE 7 HERE 
4 Lesion Studies 
Having established the basic stability of the model, a number of lesioning studies were performed to 
investigate theories of action disorganisation. These studies, which were all motivated by 
contemporary theories of action disorganisation or frontal dysfunction, involved varying some 
                                                     
4The lunchbox lid was not bound as a target for all packing operations because other objects were used as targets 
between the initial (erroneous) packing action and the later packing actions. 
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parameter from its default value and exploring the resultant behaviour of the model in light of the key 
empirical findings on action disorganisation isolated above. This section reports three studies in detail: 
varying the balance between top-down excitation of schemas and bottom-up, environmental, 
triggering of schemas, increasing noise in the schema network, and increasing noise in the object 
representation network. Several other studies motivated by contemporary theories of frontal 
dysfunction were also conducted (e.g., both persistence and self influence were decreased in an 
attempt to simulate goal decay (Duncan, 1995; Duncan et al., 1995), lateral inhibition was decreased 
in an attempt to simulate a general inhibitory deficit (Verfaellie & Heilman, 1987; Fuster, 1997), and 
top-down excitation within the schema network was reduced in the absence of a corresponding 
increase in bottom-up excitation in an attempt to explore whether deficient top-down excitation alone 
could account for action disorganisation), but none of these studies yielded appreciable levels of 
commission errors, and so they are not described in detail. 
Each study involved attempting to relate model behaviour to the behaviour of patients as one 
parameter was varied, with the degree of parameter variation mapping to patient severity. Several 
analyses are presented below for each study. First, unbiased sampling of behaviour from the full 
parameter range is presented and a two-way analysis of variance is used in order to determine the main 
effects of severity and distractor object presence and any interactions between these independent 
variables on each of the principal dependent variables. While statistically important, such effects are 
not necessarily reflected in the group data from patient studies because the group may not represent an 
unbiased sample from the assumed severity continuum. Thus, in Schwartz et al.’s (1998) study, there 
were many patients of mild to moderate severity and few patients of high severity. In fact, 
consideration of the raw error scores of Schwartz et al.’s (1998) patient group suggests severity was 
distributed according to Zipf’s Law (Zipf, 1949). That is, if s is an index of severity, then f(s), the 
frequency of patients of severity s, is given by 
f(s) = k . s–α 
where k is a constant of proportionality and α is approximately 1. This is also suggested by the 
distribution of standardised error scores shown in Figure 1 (which is roughly hyperbolic, as would be 
expected with a Zipf distribution), and is plausible given that the patient group was based on 
consecutive inpatient admissions: one would expect that beyond a certain baseline level necessary for 
admission as an inpatient, mild brain injuries would be more common than severe injuries. 
Using the total error score as the index of severity, the log-log scatter plot of s against f(s) for 
Schwartz et al.’s (1998) patients showed a strong linear trend, as would be expected from Zipf’s Law, 
and regression analysis yielded a best fit with α = 1.089 (accounting for 0.747 of the variance in the 
frequency distribution). Given this, in a second analysis for each study the model data were sampled 
according to a Zipf distribution with α = 1.089 and converted to standardised error scores following 
the procedure of Schwartz et al. (1998). 
The sampling procedure was as follows: The levels of damage within the model were ordered 
according to severity (e.g., in the case of increasing noise in the schema network, from least noise to 
most noise). Minimum and maximum levels of damage were then determined by selecting values of 
the parameter that gave a reasonable fit to the total error scores of the least and most severe patients. 
Cases equivalent to single patients with varying degrees of deficit were then selected from the severity 
distribution with the probability of selecting a case with damage d units from the minimum being 
proportional to d–α. 30 cases were selected in this way from the subset of simulation runs performed 
with distractors present. 30 additional simulation cases were then selected from the subset of 
simulation runs performed with distractors absent. These additional cases were matched pair-wise for 
level of damage with the first 30 cases. The standardised error scores for each pair where then 
averaged to produce a distribution of 30 simulated participants with dependent measures directly 
comparable to those shown in Figure 1. 
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In two of the three studies, where the distribution of standardised error scores appears promising, a 
third analysis is presented in order to drive empirical predictions. The analysis of variance results from 
the unbiased sample are not comparable with patient data for two reasons. First, they are based on an 
even sampling of all levels of damage. Second, they employ level of damage as a factor. As noted 
above Schwartz et al.’s (1998) group of CHI patients were distributed by severity according to Zipf’s 
law, and there is every reason to expect that any clinical sample will be distributed in this way. It is 
also not possible to determine level of damage within any single patient in a general, non-task-
specific, way. In the third analysis, the simulation data were therefore resampled and analysed using 
single-factor tests (i.e., t-tests) in order to determiner the model’s predictions with respect to a clinical 
sample. Again, sampling assumed a Zipf distribution with α = 1.089. This analysis used the largest 
possible sample from the simulation data. Thus, if 100 trials were initially performed at each level of 
the parameter, then all 100 trials in each condition were selected from the baseline value of the 
parameter, 47 (i.e., 100 / 2α) trials were selected from the next value, 30 (i.e., 100 / 3α) trials were 
selected from the next value, and so on. The size of the resulting sample, which we refer to as a 
“clinical” sample, depends on the number of levels of the parameter sampled within the range. 
4.1 Study 1: Altering the Top-Down / Bottom-Up Balance within the Schema Network 
As discussed in the introduction, it has been suggested that action disorganisation following brain 
injury is a result of reduced top-down excitation within a hierarchically organised action control 
system, resulting in increased sensitivity to the contingencies afforded by the environment for action. 
This proposal follows from Luria’s (1966) claim that “frontal apraxia” (i.e., action disorganisation) is 
an extreme form of an executive disorder resulting from frontal lobe damage, and Shallice’s (1982, 
1988) account of frontal lobe executive disorder in terms of a loosening of SAS control over CS (cf. 
Schwartz et al., 1991). Cooper & Shallice (2000) provided computational support for this view by 
demonstrating that a model of simple ADL based on CS principles did show many qualitative features 
of action disorganisation when the balance of excitation to schema nodes was shifted away from top-
down sources and towards bottom-up (i.e., environmental) sources. In order to further evaluate the 
hypothesis that action disorganisation is a consequence of reduced top-down excitation coupled with 
increased bottom-up excitation within a hierarchically structured action selection system we explored 
the effect of reducing IS, the parameter governing the flow of top-down activation within the schema 
network, while increasing ES, the parameter governing the flow of bottom-up activation on the schema 
network, on the behaviour of the revised model when performing the complex ADL of preparing and 
packing a lunchbox. 
4.1.1 Method 
The parameters S, L and N were fixed at their default values (0.23, 0.46 and 0.01 respectively). The 
model was run 100 times with distractor objects present and 100 times with distractor objects absent 
for values of IS, the parameter specifying the degree of top-down excitation passed from selected 
schemas to their component schemas within the schema networks, ranging from 0.50 to 0.40 at 
intervals of 0.005 and ES, the parameter specifying the degree of bottom-up excitation passed from the 
representation of objects, ranging from 0.10 to 0.20 at intervals of 0.005 (i.e., a total of 100 × 2 × 21 = 
4200 simulation runs). IS + ES was held constant at 0.60 throughout all simulations.5 
4.1.2 Results 
The action scripts generated by each run of the model were scored using the automated scoring 
program described above. There was a strong and highly significant negative correlation between 
accomplishment score and the number of omission errors (r = –0.992, d.f. = 4198, p < 0.001). While 
                                                     
5The simultaneous variation of IS and ES was motivated by the need to provide a reasonable net level of 
excitation to the schema network. If ES is fixed while IS is decreased, corresponding to a decrease in top-down 
control with fixed bottom-up excitation, then there comes a point when there is insufficient excitation in the 
schema network to activate any schemas. The model then ceases to execute any actions and omission errors are 
recorded. Increasing IS while ES is decreased ensures action continues and provides scope for the generation of 
commission errors. 
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only 5% of errors were commission errors, the correlation between accomplishment score and the total 
number of errors of commission was also significantly negative (r = –0.456, d.f. = 4198, p < 0.001). 
Figure 8 shows the mean number of errors for each parameter value, broken into addition, sequence, 
omission, and substitution errors. The fit with empirical data is poor. There is a clear lack of errors of 
commission, which were virtually at floor in both conditions. In fact, no substitution errors were 
observed in either condition, and while 14,867 omission errors were observed, there were only 140 
sequence errors. The only other errors of commission were all action additions, with 659 such errors 
distributed evenly between the two experimental conditions. Statistical analysis confirmed that the 
manipulation of the level of Is / ES had a significant effect on total errors (F(20, 4158) = 678.032; p < 
0.001), the number of omission errors (F(20, 4158) = 680.790; p < 0.001), and the number of 
commission errors (F(20, 4158) = 57.864; p < 0.001). There were also significant effects of distractor 
condition on total errors (F(1, 4158) = 30.862; p < 0.001), number of omission errors (F(1, 4158) = 
36.936; p < 0.001) and number of commission errors (F(1, 4158) = 19.912; p < 0.001), but in each 
case the presence of distractors led to fewer errors of each type, rather than more errors. Finally, there 
was no interaction between level of IS / ES and distractor condition on total errors (F(20, 4158) = 
1.202; n.s.), number of omission errors (F(20, 4158) = 1.350, n.s.) or number of commission errors 
(F(20, 4158) = 1.388; n.s.). 
INSERT FIGURE 8 HERE 
 
A subset of 60 simulation runs (corresponding to 30 simulated participants in each condition) was then 
selected from the entire set to form a biased sample using the Zipf distribution as described above. The 
most plausible fit to the patient data was obtained with IS ranging from 0.450 (least severe) to 0.420 
(most severe). Figure 9 shows the bar chart of standardised error scores for these 30 simulated 
participants. 
INSERT FIGURE 9 HERE 
Comparison of Figure 9 with Figure 1 supports the initial analyses: the behaviour of the model under 
this parameter manipulation is not comparable to that of Schwartz et al.’s (1998) CHI patients, even 
when realistic sampling biases are invoked. The manipulation predicts that most patients will produce 
only omission errors, something which is not true of Schwartz et al.’s (1998) CHI patient group. 
4.1.3 Discussion 
The simulation results suggest that action disorganisation cannot be accounted for in terms of an 
imbalance between top-down and bottom-up excitation within the schema network. While such an 
imbalance reproduces significant correlations between accomplishment and omission/commission 
error rates, it fails to account for the relative frequency of commission errors observed by Schwartz et 
al. (1998). It also fails to yield the correct main effects of distractor condition (i.e., more omission and 
substitution errors when distractors are present). In addition, it fails to predict a graded effect of 
severity: omission errors dominate behaviour when IS falls to below 0.450, but greater reductions in IS 
do not lead to more omission errors, or indeed to poorer accomplishment scores. 
This negative result is at odds with the simulation results derived from the earlier version of the model, 
which demonstrated that a reduction in top-down excitation coupled with an increase in bottom-up 
excitation did provide a qualitative account of action disorganisation syndrome in the simpler task of 
coffee preparation. Addition and sequence errors were common in those simulations. The relative 
absence of such errors in the current simulations is due to two factors. First, sequence errors are 
discouraged by the use of strict pre-conditions and post-conditions introduced in order to simulate 
behaviour on the more complex ADL task of preparing and packing a lunchbox. Second, close 
examination of the model behaviour reveals that simple action additions are in fact common when IS is 
below 0.450, but the scoring system is conservative and does not count these additions. Almost all of 
these additions take the form of repetitive toying behaviours (e.g., perseveratively picking up and then 
putting down an object). These behaviours were not scored by Schwartz et al. (1998). Hence they have 
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also not been scored in the present work. They do, however, suggest an alternative interpretation of the 
parameter manipulation: that such a manipulation may provide an account of utilisation behaviour of 
the type described by Shallice et al. (1989; See also Schwartz et al., 1991). One possible objection to 
this interpretation is the high rate of omission errors that occur when IS is below 0.450. Previous 
descriptions of utilisation behaviour have not noted high rates of such errors. This may be because 
such studies have focussed on the behaviour as induced (Lhermitte, 1983) or incidental to a primary 
task (Shallice et al., 1989), rather than on primary, naturalistic, task behaviour itself. Certainly 
previous studies have not examined utilisation behaviour within the context of a task as complex as 
that considered here. It is plausible that within such relatively complex tasks omission errors may arise 
from the complete failure to perform subtasks – a possibility not available within tasks traditionally 
used to investigate utilisation behaviour. The above interpretation, and the possible relation between 
utilisation behaviour and action disorganisation syndrome, is addressed in more detail in the general 
discussion. 
4.2 Study 2: Increasing Noise within the Schema Network 
Deficits in action selection following frontal injury occur in a wide range of patients. The deficit 
appears to be the result of generalised rather than localised damage, and its severity varies along a 
continuum (arguably with normals at one extreme: cf. Schwartz et al., 1998). These factors suggest 
that the deficit might be due to a non-specific disruption to the precision of the action selection 
system(s). Such damage may be simulated within the current model by increasing NS, the noise in 
activation flow throughout the schema network. Increasing schema noise degrades the effectiveness of 
selective excitation and inhibition within the schema network. Thus, and in order to investigate the 
hypothesis that action disorganisation is a consequence of generalised damage within the schema 
network, we compared the effects of increasing NS on model behaviour in the two experimental 
conditions (i.e., with distractor objects absent and present). 
4.2.1 Method 
The parameters S, L, IS and ES were fixed at their default values (0.23, 0.46, 0.50 and 0.10, 
respectively). The model was run 100 times with distractor objects present and 100 times with 
distractor objects absent for values of NS, the parameter specifying the standard deviation of noise 
within the schema network, ranging from 0.01 to 0.25 at intervals of 0.01 (i.e., a total of 100 × 2 × 25 
= 5000 runs).  
4.2.2 Results 
The action scripts generated by each run of the model were scored using the scoring program 
described above. As in Study 1, there was a strong and highly significant negative correlation between 
accomplishment score and number of omission errors (r = –0.975, d.f. = 4998, p < 0.001). The 
correlation between accomplishment score and number of commission errors was more mild (r = –
0.429, d.f. = 4998, p < 0.001), but still negative and highly significant, as in Schwartz et al.’s (1998) 
CHI patient data. 
Figure 10 shows the mean standardised error rates for each value of NS (with NS decreasing from left 
to right), broken into the four standard categories. It is apparent that with increasing levels of noise, 
both omission and commission errors increase. Inspection of the data suggest some clear differences 
between experimental conditions, with signs of increased rates of omission errors and substitution 
errors when distractor objects are present. This is supported by statistical analysis. There was an effect 
of level of NS on total errors (F(24, 4950) = 299.043; p < 0.001), on the number of omission errors 
(F(24, 4950) = 106.609; p < 0.001), and on the number of commission errors (F(24, 4950) = 432.811; 
p < 0.001). There was also an effect of distractor condition on total errors (F(1, 4950) = 68.114; p < 
0.001), number of omission errors (F(1, 4950) = 53.508; p < 0.001) and number of commission errors 
(F(1, 4950) = 14.589; p < 0.001). There was a mild interaction between level of NS and distractor 
condition on total errors (F(24, 4950) = 1.583; p < 0.05), but not on number of omission errors (F(24, 
4950) = 1.270; n.s.) or on number of commission errors (F(24, 4950) = 0.586; n.s.). The interaction 
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appears to be the result of a decreased effect of NS and condition on errors at the extremes of the NS 
range. 
INSERT FIGURE 10 HERE 
Figure 11 shows the corresponding bar chart of standardised error scores for 30 simulated participants 
sampled according to the Zipf distribution as described above. Comparison of Figure 11 with Figure 1 
suggests that this manipulation is worthy of further consideration. Omission errors are, as ever, 
common, but other types of error occur at non-negligible rates, and the proportion of commission 
errors appears to be substantially greater for low error producers than for high error producers. 
INSERT FIGURE 11 HERE 
A “clinical” sample consisting of 564 trials was constructed based on a Zipf distribution according to 
the procedure described above. Between-condition t-tests on standardised scores for the various error 
types with this sample revealed that the presence of distractor objects led to significant increases in 
omission errors (increasing from 15.66 to 19.88 omissions per 100 opportunities: t(562) = 2.302, p < 
0.05) and object substitution errors (increasing from 0.14 to 1.06 object substitutions per 100 
opportunities: t(562) = 7.339, p < 0.001), but not sequence  errors (t(562) = –0.799, n.s.) or action 
additions (t(562) = –1.697, n.s.). Ignoring the 323 trials from the clinical sample with zero errors and 
separating the remaining 241 trials into two groups based on total error score (ignoring distractor 
condition) led to standardised commission proportions of 0.3721 for the low error producers and 
0.0290 for the high error producers. The difference between groups was highly significant (t(239) = 
12.192, p < 0.001). 
4.2.3 Discussion 
Increasing noise within the schema network appears to capture many of the principal characteristics of 
action disorganisation. The dominant error type in both experimental conditions is that of omission. 
Additions, substitutions, and sequence errors occur, but at substantially lower levels. While these 
levels are lower than those observed in the patient data, the negative correlation between 
accomplishment and number of errors of commission, reported by Schwartz et al. (1998) for CHI 
patients, is present. The correlation observed in the model data is weaker than that observed in the 
patient data, but the effect of schema noise on commission errors is significant: it remains the case that  
failure to accomplish the task is not entirely due to errors of omission. At the same time, low error 
producers produce a greater proportion of commission errors (as in the patient sample). 
The manipulation of noise within the schema network also captures several between-condition effects: 
for higher values of noise, both omission and substitution errors are more frequent when distractor 
objects are present than when they are absent. The effects of distractor objects on action additions and 
sequence errors is small, and the effect of distractor objects is greater (in absolute terms) on omission 
errors than on substitution errors. 
These simulations, and in particular the similarities between Figure 1 and Figure 11, support the view 
that action disorganisation results from a generalised deficit within a hierarchical schema network, a 
deficit that may be modelled in terms of increased noise within that network. The fit with patient data 
is not perfect, but the key findings – the occurrence of errors of commission in both conditions and the 
significant increase in omission and object substitution errors when distractor objects are present – are 
in marked contrast to the findings of Study 1. 
A sceptic might argue that the pattern of errors both observed in the patients and obtained in this 
simulation is not surprising. Multiple factors may impact upon the selection of any individual action 
and the objects to which it is applied. Consequently errors of action are likely to be determined by 
multiple interactions (Reason, 1990). Furthermore, different forms of breakdown within the action 
control system might yield qualitatively similar errors profiles (Buxbaum, et al, 1998). Alternatively, 
any qualitative variation between Schwartz et al.’s (1998) patients may have been obscured by the 
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group study methodology employed. If such factors do yield a blurred picture of action 
disorganisation, then, the sceptic may argue, it is not surprising that increased noise, a blunt tool at the 
best of times, should match this picture. Perhaps the most telling counters to this argument are the 
facts that 1) even when one controls for opportunities, errors of the various types are not equally 
frequent (as an atheoretic analysis of noise might suggest), and 2) severity and condition interact in 
their effects upon omission and substitution errors, but not in their effects upon addition and sequence 
errors, both in the patient data and in the simulation results. Thus, the model predicts differential 
effects of schema noise, and these differential effects are precisely those seen in the patient data. 
4.3 Study 3: Increasing Noise within the Object Representation Networks 
Several factors suggest that further investigation of the effects of noise is warranted. Reciprocal 
interactions between the schema and object representation networks within the model mean that noise 
in either network will immediately propagate to the other networks. Given that noise is, as noted 
above, a blunt tool, it is conceivable that noise affecting the object representation networks will yield 
similar behavioural effects to noise affecting the schema network. If the effects of schema noise and 
object representation noise are indistinguishable, then the interpretation of action disorganisation 
syndrome as a disturbance of schema activation will require further consideration. Thus, it is of 
considerable interest to determine whether the effects of noise in the schema network may be 
distinguished from the effects of noise elsewhere in the system. For these reasons an additional study 
was conducted in which NO, noise in the object representation networks, was varied. 
4.3.1 Method 
Study 2 was repeated with NS fixed at its default value (0.01) and variable levels of NO. That is, the 
parameters S, L, IS and ES were fixed at their default values (0.23, 0.46, 0.50 and 0.10, respectively) 
and the model was run 100 times with distractor objects present and 100 times with distractor objects 
absent for values of NO, the parameter specifying the standard deviation of noise within the object 
representation networks, ranging from 0.01 to 0.25 at intervals of 0.01 (i.e., a total of 100 × 2 × 25 = 
5000 runs). 
4.3.2 Results 
The action scripts generated by each run of the model were scored using the scoring program 
described above. As in studies 1 and 2, there was a strong and highly significant negative correlation 
between accomplishment score and number of omission errors (r = –0.974, d.f. = 4998, p < 0.001). 
The correlation between accomplishment score and number of commission errors was, however, 
mildly positive (r = +0.172). 
Figure 12 shows the mean standardised error rates for each value of NO (with NO decreasing from left 
to right), broken into the four standard categories. A pattern similar to Figure 10 is present, though 
substitution errors appear to be more frequent and action additions less frequent. As in Study 2, 
inspection of the data suggest some clear differences between experimental conditions, with increased 
rates of omission errors, substitution errors and action additions when distractor objects are present. 
This is supported by statistical analysis. There was an effect of level of NO on total errors (F(24, 4950) 
= 212.511; p < 0.001), on the number of omission errors (F(24, 4950) = 110.033; p < 0.001), and on 
the number of commission errors (F(24, 4950) = 39.036; p < 0.001). There was also an effect of 
distractor condition on total errors (F(1, 4950) = 49.031; p < 0.001), number of omission errors (F(1, 
4950) = 20.483; p < 0.001) and number of commission errors (F(1, 4950) = 13.909; p < 0.001). There 
was no interaction between level of NO and distractor condition on total errors (F(24, 4950) = 1.366; 
n.s.), number of omission errors (F(24, 4950) = 0.982; n.s.), or number of commission errors (F(24, 
4950) = 0.316; n.s.). 
INSERT FIGURE 12 HERE 
Figure 13 shows a bar chart of standardised error scores for 30 simulated participants sampled 
according to the Zipf distribution as described above. Comparison of Figure 13 with Figure 1 and 
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Figure 11 suggests that this manipulation, like that of Study 2, is worthy of further consideration. Once 
again omission errors are common, but other types of error occur at non-negligible rates, and as in 
Study 2 the proportion of commission errors appears to be substantially greater for low error producers 
than for high error producers. 
INSERT FIGURE 13 HERE 
A “clinical” sample of the simulated data was constructed as for Study 2, and between-condition t-
tests on standardised scores for the various error types were performed. The sample consisted of 604 
trials, 310 of which were error free. The t-tests revealed a significant effect of distractor presence on 
omission errors (increasing from 9.58 to 13.33 omissions per 100 opportunities: t(602) = 2.763, p < 
0.005), but not on other error types. Separating the errorful sub-sample into two groups based on total 
error score (ignoring distractor condition) led to standardised commission proportions of 0.7966 for 
the low error producers and 0.1220 for the high error producers. The between-group difference was 
highly significant (t(292) = 30.385, p < 0.001). This sampling procedure also reversed the sign of the 
correlation between accomplishment and commission errors, suggesting that the correlation is non-
linear. 
4.3.3 Discussion 
Noise in the object representation networks appears to yield behaviour that is similar both to that 
produced by noise in the schema network and to that of the various patient groups. It provides a good 
account of the relative proportions of commission and omission errors as a function of severity – 
yielding quantitatively appropriate values for standardised commission proportions in both low and 
high error producers – and of the effect of distractor presence on the various error types. It also leads 
to a distribution of error types that is plausible (i.e., not completely dominated by omission errors). In 
fact, the only questionable aspect of the model’s behaviour under this manipulation is the positive 
correlation between accomplishment and commission errors, but even this effect was reversed when 
clinical biases in sampling were taken into account. Noise in the object representation networks 
therefore appears to provide a viable alternative to noise in the schema network as an account of action 
disorganisation syndrome. 
The similarities between behaviour produced by increasing noise in the schema and object 
representation networks should not be surprising. As suggested above, reciprocal interactions between 
schema nodes and object representation nodes are likely to mean that any noise in one network is 
quickly propagated to other networks. However, the effect of noise in the object representation 
network is not merely to add noise to schema activations. The transmission of noise to the schema 
network from the object representation networks is modulated by schema triggering functions. Thus, 
noise in the object representation networks has the effect of degrading triggering excitation of 
schemas. It is for this reason that noise in the object representation does not merely result in increased 
levels of object substitution errors: such noise affects the activation of schemas – and hence the 
schemas that are selected – as much as the selection of objects to fill argument roles once a schema 
has been selected. 
Notwithstanding the general similarities in behaviour produced by this manipulation and that of Study 
2, several clear differences are evident from comparison of Figure 10 and Figure 12. Noise in the 
schema network results in near linear increases in the rates of all error types with severity, with action 
additions being the most common commission error. Noise in the object representation networks 
yields lower rates of action additions (and sequence errors), but higher rates of object substitution 
errors. The linear increase in error rates is also only evident for mild increases in the parameter. These 
differences, as discussed below, suggest that detailed empirical investigation may be able to 
discriminate between the two forms of disruption modelled by noise. 
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5 General Discussion 
5.1 Model behaviour and its implications for theories of action disorganisation syndrome 
The three simulation studies demonstrate that the disorganisation seen in the everyday behaviour of 
CHI patients cannot be accounted for purely in terms of an imbalance of top-down and bottom-up 
sources of activation within a hierarchically organised action selection system. Rather, they suggest 
that the disorganisation is better characterised in terms of disturbances either to activation propagation 
within the schema network or from the object representations triggering schemas. Such disturbances, 
modelled by increasing noise in the schema (Study 2) and object representation (Study 3) networks, 
can account for the majority of the behavioural phenomena outlined at the beginning of this paper. 
Before discussing some implications of this result for theories of action disorganisation, we consider 
some more general questions relating to the origins of error within the model. 
5.1.1 On the origins of errors 
It is clear from the simulation results that errors of each type produced by the model do not have a 
simple origin. If this were the case, one would expect each parameter manipulation to produce a 
characteristic type of error. This is not the behaviour observed in patients (i.e., there are not patients 
who make purely object substitution errors or purely sequence errors – instead, action disorganisation 
patients make a mix of errors) or in the model when a parameter is varied from its default value. It is 
therefore of interest to consider the origins of the various error types. 
Sequence errors typically arise because a schema becomes active when its pre-condition is not 
satisfied. For example, a typical anticipation-omission error in the lunch packing task involves pouring 
from a sealed container. This error occurs when the pour schema becomes active even though its pre-
condition (that an open container be held) is not satisfied. This may occur if, for example, there is too 
much noise in the schema network. Sequence errors can also arise if noise in the object representation 
networks leads to inappropriate or untimely triggering of a schema. Noise in all networks has a 
particular strong effect in the early stages of competition, when the activations of several schemas or 
object representations are relatively similar. Sequence errors are arguably less common in the 
simulation studies than in patient behaviour, but this is largely because pre-conditions act in an all-or-
none fashion. Use of graded pre-conditions would result in increased rates of sequence errors. 
One important type of sequence error – that of perseveration – can occur as a result of the error 
recovery mechanism. This mechanism works by attempting to repeat a schema when, on completion, 
the schema’s post-condition fails. If much of the schema completed successfully, this can result in a 
perseveration. Alternatively, perseverative errors may arise from the same kind of inappropriate 
activity in the schema network that results in other forms of sequence error. 
Object substitution errors arise when an apparently appropriate schema is selected but an incorrect or 
inappropriate object representation is most active. Typically this is a result of a malfunction in the 
competitive processes within the object representation networks (e.g., because of noise in the object 
representation networks), but it may also reflect an error in schema selection (e.g., schemas for one 
subtask becoming active when objects for another subtask are already highly active). 
There are several ways in which action additions may arise. First, they may simply be particularly 
flagrant object substitution errors that cannot obviously be interpreted within the ongoing task. 
Second, action additions may reflect selection of an inappropriate schema due to an error in the 
resolution of schema competition (e.g., due to noise in the schema network). Third, action additions 
may result from triggering of an inappropriate schema due to inappropriate activity in an object 
representation network. Only the last of these can truly be classified as utilisation behaviour, but the 
different possible origins of action additions cannot be distinguished without recourse to the state of 
the schema and object representation networks. 
The final type of error produced by the model is that of omission. Such errors are common and 
generally result when the model wanders “off task” after making some other kind of error. Such 
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wandering can result in failure to complete the task – a behaviour observed by Schwartz et al. (1998) 
in their more severe patients. Omission errors may also arise if a schema is inappropriately deselected 
(e.g., because its activation is not sustained until all of its necessary sub-schemas are completed). 
Given the first of these origins of omission errors, it is likely that extensions to the model in the form 
of additional error correction procedures the keep the model going would reduce the number of 
omission errors, leading to relatively more commission errors. While omission errors are arguably too 
frequent in the behaviour of the lesioned model, such extensions have not been attempted for two 
reasons. First, whilst error monitoring is computationally simple, full error correction can require 
general problem solving. If in the lunch packing task, for example, the thermos is packed into the 
lunch box before being filled, then significant problem solving is required to plan appropriate 
corrective behaviour. Second and more pertinently, as is clear from Luria’s analysis cited in the 
introduction, patients with severe frontal injuries appear to show limited monitoring and error 
correction. Implementation of complex error correction procedures would therefore seem 
inappropriate when modelling behavioural disorders such as action disorganisation syndrome. 
It is certainly the case that a high rate of omission errors occurs in situations where at times the model 
has gone sufficiently off course that other types of (codable) error cannot occur. Similarly, the 
omission of entire subtasks may affect the opportunity for other types of error.6 While this does reduce 
the sensitivity of the coding system somewhat, it is worth noting that the simulation correctly predicts 
increasing rates of all three other error types with increasing noise in the schema network: for the 
object network the rate of the other error types remains roughly constant with increasing noise. 
5.1.2 On disorders of action selection 
It appears that the key features of action disorganisation syndrome may be accounted for either by a 
generalised disturbance of schema activation or by a generalised disturbance to the triggering of 
schema activations from object representations (or both, as increased noise in both networks also leads 
to behaviour comparable to action disorganisation syndrome). The similarity in behaviours resulting 
from these two conceptually distinct forms of disturbance is ultimately due to the reciprocal coupling 
between schemas and object representations. The similarities mean, however, that the simulation 
results may be interpreted in at least two ways. First, action disorganisation syndrome in all patient 
groups studied by Schwartz, Buxbaum and colleagues might be the result of a single functional deficit 
(modelled by noise in either the schema network, the object representation networks, or indeed both). 
Second, and more intriguingly, the behaviourally similar deficits in action organisation exhibited by 
the various patient groups may be due to distinct functional impairments. 
The first interpretation is consistent with Schwartz et al.’s (1998) resource hypothesis: that action 
disorganisation in CHI, LCVA and RCVA patients is the result of a single functional deficit 
characterisable in terms of a reduction in cognitive resources. Such a reduction in resources is likely to 
result in a generalised increase in confusability between similar representations within action-related 
subsystems (i.e., of schemas and of object representations), and hence can be modelled by increased 
noise within all networks.7 
                                                     
6 In theory the patient data could also be affected in this way; however, the evidence suggests otherwise.  In a re-
analysis of the MLAT data, Schwartz (unpublished) identified all instances in which entire subtasks were 
omitted and corrected error and opportunity counts accordingly.  Thus, the steps within omitted subtasks no 
longer contributed to the count of step omissions, and they were deemed to afford no opportunity for 
commission errors.  This reanalysis did not alter the major findings.  In particular, standardized error rates 
remained highest for step omissions, followed by sequence and substitution errors respectively; perseverations 
and reversals were rare; and error patterns were consistent across patient groups.   
7The notion of cognitive resource as appealed to be Schwartz et al. (1998) should not be confused with the 
notion of a cognitive resource in the interactive activation model. In the former, a cognitive resource is 
something consumed by a process, so processing is in some way limited by available resources. In the latter, a 
cognitive resource is a subsystem (e.g., a language processing subsystem) that may be called upon in order to 
carry out a schema, so a resource may be allocated during execution of a schema. 
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While the simulation studies reported here cannot rule out the above (i.e., first) interpretation, the 
second interpretation is also worth pursuing as it is consistent with neurological evidence that suggests 
action disorganisation syndrome and ideational apraxia have distinct origins. In addition and as 
described below, it yields clear and testable predictions relating to subtle between-group differences in 
the errorful behaviour of the various patient groups. This second interpretation is also consistent with 
Buxbaum et al.’s (1998) suggestion that multiple sources of breakdown in human action selection may 
result in similar behavioural disturbances. 
If we assume that disorganisation of action in different patient groups is a consequence of distinct 
functional impairments, then a plausible account of the simulation findings is that the action 
disorganisation of CHI patients is a consequence of a generalised disturbance to schema activation (as 
intentional control and the maintenance of task representations, generally regarded as frontal 
functions, are commonly disrupted in CHI), whereas the action disorganisation of patients with left 
temporoparietal damage (traditionally regarded as ideational apraxics) is a consequence of a 
disturbance to schema triggering from object representations. 
The above interpretation accounts for the results of the group studies of Schwartz, Buxbaum and 
colleagues, but does not fully account for the behaviour of the two patients studied by Humphreys & 
Forde (1998: see also Forde & Humphreys, 2002). Recall that the behaviour of these patients differed 
from those studied by Schwartz, Buxbaum and colleagues in two respects. First, they produced high 
rates of perseverative errors and second the presence of distractor objects did not appear to affect their 
behaviour on the set of tasks studied. One potential reason for these differences lies in the relative 
severity of the patients studied by Humphreys & Forde (1998). The patients of Schwartz, Buxbaum 
and colleagues produced on average 1 to 2 errors per task, while those of Humphreys & Forde (1998) 
produced on average 6 to 7 errors per task. Indeed, the severity and behaviour of the Humphreys & 
Forde patients are more comparable to those of earlier patients described by Schwartz et al. (1991: 
HH, a severe stroke victim) and Schwartz et al. (1995: JK, a severe CHI patient), both of whom 
produced significant numbers of perseverative errors on some tasks. The differences may mean that 
the behaviour of these more severe patients is affected by other factors beyond a non-specific 
disruption of activation within the schema network. Indeed, while the model does produce 
perseverative errors when noise is increased in the schema and/or object representation networks, they 
are more frequent when self influence is high and/or lateral inhibition is low. One possibility therefore 
is that these more severe patients also have an inhibitory deficit. 
The results of Study 1 also bear further interpretation. The model exhibits a pure form of utilisation 
behaviour following decreased top-down and increased bottom-up activation within the schema 
network. This corresponds very closely to the account of utilisation behaviour offered by Lhermitte 
(1983) and Shallice et al. (1989), but effectively the same account has been given for action 
disorganisation syndrome (Schwartz et al., 1991; Cooper & Shallice, 2000) and for ideational apraxia 
(Rumiati et al., 2001). Study 1 supports the former view – that utilisation behaviour results from 
decreased top-down and increased bottom-up activation within the schema network. Together with 
studies 2 and 3, it also suggests that utilisation behaviour is distinct from both action disorganisation 
syndrome and ideational apraxia, and that utilisation behaviour can in principle dissociate from these 
two other disorders of action. 
5.1.3 Model predictions 
The proposed interpretation of the three simulation studies presented here leads to several predictions. 
First, if utilisation behaviour and action disorganisation syndrome arise from distinct disorders, then 
the disorders should dissociate and should have distinct behavioural consequences on ADL. Thus, the 
interpretation predicts that some patients (presumably those with localised medial bilateral frontal 
damage) will exhibit pure utilisation behaviour with toying and omissions due to a tendency to move 
off-task, but with few genuine object substitution or sequence errors, while others (e.g., CHI patients 
and those with more wide-spread neural damage) will exhibit a more generalised action 
disorganisation including non-negligible rates of all error types. 
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Second, if action disorganisation syndrome is a consequence of generalised frontal damage leading to 
a disturbance to activation within the schema network while ideational apraxia is a consequence of 
temporoparietal damage affecting schema triggering by object representations, then there should be 
subtle but in principle measurable differences between the groups on ADL. First, action 
disorganisation syndrome patients should show a tendency towards more action addition errors, while 
IA patients should show a tendency towards more object substitution errors. Second, while both 
groups should be sensitive to the presence of distractor objects (and produce more omission errors in 
their presence), action disorganisation syndrome patients should also produce more object substitution 
errors when distractors are present, while IA patients should show uniformly high rates of object 
substitution errors. Should these predictions, which remain to be tested, fail to hold, the model itself 
will not be falsified, though the interpretation suggested here will be. 
5.2 Difficulties in the study of action selection and its disorders 
There are several major difficulties in assessing theories and models of the breakdown of complex 
sequential action selection. These difficulties revolve around the establishment of appropriate target 
empirical phenomena. In some domains (e.g., acquired dyslexia: cf. Hinton & Shallice, 1991; Plaut & 
Shallice, 1993), target phenomena may be derived from case studies of a number of individual patients 
by having each patient perform hundreds of trials using different types of stimulus and/or under 
different experimental conditions. The practicality of this approach is limited within the domain of 
complex sequential action selection because there are a limited number of tasks that might be 
investigated, individual tasks are relatively time-consuming (taking tens of minutes, rather than 
seconds, to complete), and objective means of controlling task difficulty are not available. In addition, 
having one patient perform the same task multiple times in order to determine the stability of a deficit 
is likely to introduce practice effects. In order to work around this we have used group data derived 
from participant performance on a range of tasks, with between-task differences in the number of 
opportunities of each type of error being controlled for by working with standardised error rates.  
Neither of the above workarounds is entirely satisfactory. Data from patients with unusual patterns of 
deficit can be mistaken for noise within group studies. Thus, while Schwartz et al. (1998) argue that 
the data shown in Figure 1 represents patients on a continuum with increasing rates of omission errors 
as severity increases, the data are equally compatible with different subgroups of action 
disorganisation syndrome, some of which involve primarily sequence errors (patients 15, 16, 21, 23 
and 24 in Figure 1), object substitution errors (patient 14) or some combination of sequence and object 
substitution errors (patients 13 and 20). In fact, the variability of individual performance seen in the 
simulation results (cf. Figures 11 and 13) provides some support for Schwartz et al.’s claim of a single 
deficit underlying the disorganization of behaviour in their CHI patients. In order to be sure of this, 
however, it would be necessary to obtain additional data, particularly from less severe CHI patients, on 
a wider range of ADL tasks. 
A further difficulty relates to scoring behaviour. In abstract terms, quantitative analysis requires the 
mapping of sequences of goal-directed actions onto one or more dependent measures. Humphreys and 
Forde (Humphreys & Forde, 1998; Humphreys et al., 2000; Forde & Humphreys, 2002) have focussed 
on the different types of error as a reasonable measure, while standardised error scores (which control 
for opportunities for error) have been used here and in the more recent work of Schwartz Buxbaum 
and colleagues (Schwartz et al., 1998, 1999; Buxbaum et al., 1998; Giovannetti et al., 2002) and 
earlier work by Schwartz et al. (1991, 1995) coded behaviour in terms of “crux” actions (the key 
action within a goal directed action sequence) and “independents” (actions within the scope of a crux 
which did not contribute to the achievement of the sequence’s goal). 
The difficulty is that coding of errors is not entirely objective. It is conceivable, for example, that an 
error such as adding ketchup to coffee results from pure utilisation of the ketchup (an action addition 
in the system of Schwartz et al. 1998) or from an object substitution in which ketchup and cream were 
confused. One reason for this difficulty is that it is frequently not possible to determine the true 
intentions that culminate in errorful behaviour. This is especially true with respect to the flagrant 
errors of more severe frontal patients – errors that may be difficult to interpret within the context of an 
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ongoing task. Within the model it is tempting to use internal state information (i.e., information 
regarding which schemas are selected) to resolve such coding difficulties, but this is not helpful since 
such an approach cannot be applied to patient protocols. 
Even if an objective method of classifying errors could be specified, different tasks provide different 
opportunities for error (Schwartz et al., 1991; Forde & Humphreys, 2002), and so it is still necessary 
to control for between-task differences. While standardising error scores attempts to do this, such 
scores are subjective because the number of opportunities within a task for each type of error is itself 
subjective. It is difficult, for example, to quantify the number of opportunities for action additions 
within a task, and the standardisation process will be confounded as long as there exist certain errors 
that are ambiguous as to type. 
5.3 Neural localisation 
The case studies and group studies discussed in the introduction, together with the interpretation of 
action disorganisation syndrome, ideational apraxia and utilisation behaviour presented here, allow 
some comments to made with regard to neural localisation of some of the processes that make up the 
model. The basic action disorganisation syndrome as a consequence of extensive frontal lesions 
suggests that prefrontal cortex (PFC) is involved in regulating or modulating activation within the 
schema network, perhaps by ensuring that pre-conditions and post-conditions are appropriately applied 
or by maintaining schema activations throughout a task. Substantial PFC lesions reduce the 
effectiveness with which schema activation processes operate, resulting in confusions between 
competing schemas, and ultimately action disorganisation syndrome. 
The assumption that ideational apraxia involves a disturbance to the triggering of schemas elicited by 
the representation of objects suggests that processes in the left parietal-temporal junction region are 
involved in such triggering. This derives from the traditional localisation of ideational apraxia (e.g., 
De Renzi & Lucchelli, 1998; Rumiati et al., 2001). However, the findings of Schwartz et al. (1998) 
that RCVA patients show similar disorganisation of action above and beyond any effects of neglect 
suggests that the right temporoparietal structures may also play some role. On the perspective derived 
from De Renzi & Lucchelli the object representations in left temporoparietal regions would not be 
those classically associated with object recognition in the ventral stream. Instead they would be more 
likely to be ones in the dorsal stream, which doubly dissociate from those in the ventral stream 
(Rumiati et al., 2004). They might thus correspond to action-triggering structural descriptions used in 
a direct route to action (see Humphreys & Riddoch, 2003). This separation between action-triggering 
structural descriptions and object recognition systems in the ventral stream can explain why individual 
objects can be recognised correctly but then be used in error in the context of everyday action (e.g., 
patient HG: Forde & Humphreys, 2000; patient HB: Buxbaum et al., 1997). 
Utilisation behaviour, and in particular the claim that it results from bilateral medial frontal damage, 
suggests that medial frontal structures are involved in inhibiting object relevant behaviours in favour 
of intentional control. The suggestion is that both top-down (frontal) and bottom-up (temporoparietal) 
activations combine in the activation of schemas, but that medial frontal structures are involved in 
weighting the contributions of each, but that medial frontal structures are involved in potentiating the 
contributions of each (see, e.g., Stuss et al., 1995). More specifically, the SMA is involved when no 
external cues are available to direct action (Godberg, 1985; Passingham, 1993). In other words, top-
down activation which would be necessary in the model to overcome potential utilisation behaviour 
would involve structures on the medial surface of the frontal cortex which are typically damaged in 
utilisation behaviour patients (see, e.g., Boccardi et al., 2002). 
The actual resolution of competition between schemas may well be performed by the basal ganglia. 
There is accumulating evidence (cf. Redgrave et al., 1999) that the basal ganglia implement a 
mechanism for the selection and allocation of resources to competing systems, and Gurney et al. 
(2001a, 2001b) provide a computational account of basal ganglia function within the domain of simple 
(non-sequential) action selection that is broadly consistent with the model presented here.  
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Finally, higher-level functions such as monitoring and error correction, which it is hypothesised may 
modulate activation within the schema network, are likely to be functions of PFC (Shallice & Burgess, 
1996; Shallice, 2002). Action disorganisation syndrome appears to involve an impairment to these 
processes as well as to the lower-level processes involved in regulating schema activation. 
5.4 Related models of action selection 
While there are numerous theories of frontal function that may be recruited in an attempt to account 
for action disorganisation syndrome, there are few computational accounts of the disorder. One model 
of tangential relevance is that of Kimberg & Farah (1993), who provide “a unified account of 
cognitive impairments following frontal lobe damage” implemented within the ACT-R cognitive 
architecture (Anderson & Lebiere, 1998). The model explores the hypothesis that frontal lobe 
impairments arise from a weakening of associations between working memory representations, and 
while it accounts well for a range of such impairments, Kimberg & Farah (1993) do not discuss the 
model’s predictions with respect to action selection within either simple or more complex ADL. 
More relevant is the recurrent connectionist account of action selection developed by Botvinick & 
Plaut (2002, 2004). This model encodes action sequences in a non-hierarchical recurrent network, 
using feedback connections to allow the action at each time step to be determined by the current input 
(what is held and what is in view) and a representation of task context. Intriguingly, a standard 
learning algorithm (back-propagation through time: Williams & Zipser, 1995) is capable of learning a 
suitable representation of task context. The model has been shown to provide a plausible account of 
several of the basic effects of action disorganisation syndrome in simple ADL (e.g., preparing a cup of 
tea or coffee: Botvinick & Plaut, 2004), but it has not as yet been applied to more complex ADL, or to 
situations involving variable arrays of objects. The former raises difficulties related to scaling and 
catastrophic interference. Adequate performance on the tea and coffee tasks requires that the recurrent 
network be trained for at least 10,000 epochs, with all variants of each task interleaved within each 
epoch. If the network is to learn additional tasks, then significantly more training is likely to be 
required, and if all tasks are not interleaved during training then tasks presented and acquired early in 
training will be over-written by those presented later in training. The latter appears to require 
extending the model either with additional output actions (to fixate on additional objects) or with some 
additional mechanism to map between the existing output actions (e.g., fixating and subsequently 
acting on relevant objects) and actual behaviour (e.g., fixating and subsequently acting on a distractor 
object). The interaction of the model with higher cognitive processes such as monitoring and error 
correction also appears to be problematic because such higher processes appear to require a 
representation of goals and subtasks, yet the recurrent network model explicitly eschews such 
representations (cf. Cooper, 2002). 
Yet another alternative is proposed by Humphreys & Forde (1998: see also Humphreys et al., 2000), 
who suggest that the sequential organisation of action may be due to processes of “competitive 
queuing” (Houghton, 1990). The proposal, which has not been implemented, shares much with the 
current model in that action is the result of a selection mechanism operating on a set of action nodes, 
with lateral inhibition and self influence operating on those nodes. The key difference is that top-down 
excitation is hypothesised to apply an activation gradient to scheme/action nodes. The proposal is 
promising, particularly because Hebbian mechanisms can be invoked to account for one-trial learning, 
but there are technical difficulties in specifying how hierarchical action may be encoded. Existing 
applications of competitive queuing have not addressed this issue.  
One area where the various models may be distinguished relates to disorders affecting the rate of 
behaviour. Previous work has applied an earlier version of the model presented here to disorders 
affecting the rate of action selection (specifically, amphetamine psychosis and bradykinesia: see 
Cooper & Shallice, 2000). Interactive activation, as in the current model and the proposal of 
Humphreys & Forde (1998), provides a natural substrate within which to account for disorders of rate, 
and it is unclear how such disorders may be accounted for within the recurrent network proposal of 
Botvinick & Plaut (2002, 2004). More generally, a substantial advantage of the current model over the 
above alternatives is that it provides an account of a range of disorders, including action 
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disorganisation syndrome, ideational apraxia and utilisation behaviour, as well as disorders of rate. 
These disorders are largely accounted for by modifying distinct parameters within the model. Thus, 
while the multiplicity of parameters within the model may initially appear problematic, it is supported 
by the multiplicity of dissociable deficits in action selection.  
5.5 Conclusion 
We have generalised the Cooper & Shallice (2000) model of action selection in simple ADL to more 
complex ADL, and demonstrated that the model, when lesioned, captures several empirical effects of 
brain injury on the performance of everyday action. While the previous interpretation of action 
disorganisation syndrome as an imbalance of top-down and bottom-up activation within a 
hierarchically structured schema network was found to be inadequate, two other manipulations, 
increasing noise in the schema network and increasing noise in the object representation networks, 
were found to provide good accounts of the syndrome, particularly with regard to the effects of 
severity and distractor objects on behaviour within complex ADL. Additionally, interpretation of 
utilisation behaviour as an imbalance of top-down and bottom-up activation within the schema 
network, action disorganisation syndrome as a general disturbance of schema activation (modelled by 
noise in the schema network), and ideational apraxia as a general disturbance of schema triggering 
(modelling by noise in the object representation networks), lead to several predictions. While the 
action domain presents peculiar difficulties for empirical investigation, such investigation is required 
to explore these predictions. 
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Figure 1: The profile of error types generated by 30 CHI patients on a set of ADL tasks. Errors are 
standardised such that scores represent errors per 100 opportunities. Patients are ordered from right to 
left in terms of total error score. Only three of the principal error types are shown. (Adapted from 
Schwartz et al., 1998.) 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Activation profiles of schema control nodes throughout the subtask of preparing a drink 
using a juice jar and a thermos.  Temporal nesting of component schemas within higher-level parent 
schemas is shown above the graph. Basic-level schemas are not labelled. 
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Figure 3: A fragment of the schema hierarchy, as used in the model of the lunch packing task. A 
complete list of schemas used in the model is given in Appendix A. 
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+schemaMakeLunch  
     +schemaWrapSnack  
          +schemaGetFoil  
               +schemaPickUpSource Picking up foilRoll with rightHand 
               –schemaPickUpSource  
               +schemaTear Tearing from foilRoll with leftHand 
               –schemaTear  
          –schemaGetFoil  
          +schemaGetCookie  
               +schemaOpenSourceBag  
                    +schemaPickUpSource Picking up cookiePacket with leftHand 
                    –schemaPickUpSource  
                    +schemaUnseal Discard foilRoll with rightHand 
 Unsealing cookiePacket with rightHand 
                    –schemaUnseal  
               –schemaOpenSourceBag  
               +schemaTakeFrom Taking cookie4 from cookiePacket with rightHand 
               –schemaTakeFrom  
          –schemaGetCookie  
          +schemaWrapCookie  
               +schemaCover Putting cookie4 (held in rightHand) onto foil 
               –schemaCover  
               +schemaWrap Wrapping cookie4 in foil with rightHand 
               –schemaWrap  
          –schemaWrapCookie  
     –schemaWrapSnack  
     +schemaPackSnack  
          +schemaPickUpTheme Picking up cookie4Wrapped with rightHand 
          –schemaPickUpTheme  
          +schemaPack Packing lunchBox with cookie4Wrapped held in rightHand
          –schemaPack  
     –schemaPackSnack  
     +schemaMakeDrink  
          +schemaOpenSourceJar  
               +schemaPickUpSource Picking up juiceJar with rightHand 
               –schemaPickUpSource  
               +schemaScrewOpen Discard cookiePacket with leftHand 
 Screwing open juiceJar with leftHand 
               –schemaScrewOpen  
          –schemaOpenSourceJar  
          +schemaPourFromJar  
               +schemaPour Pouring juice from juiceJar into thermos 
               –schemaPour  
          –schemaPourFromJar  
          +schemaCloseSourceJar  
          …  
 
Figure 4: A segment of well–formed action generated by the model when performing the lunch 
packing task. Schema name prefixes (+ and –) indicate selection and deselection respectively. Actions 
performed are shown on the right. In this segment the model selects appropriate actions for wrapping 
and packing a cookie, before moving on to preparing a drink. 
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   +schemaMakeLunch  
      +schemaWrapSnack  
      ...  
      –schemaWrapSnack  
      +schemaMakeDrink  
            ...  
            +schemaCapThermos  
               ...  
               +schemaPickUpTheme Picking up thermosCup with leftHand 
               –schemaPickUpTheme  
               +schemaCap Capping thermos with thermosCup held in leftHand 
               –schemaCap  
            –schemaCapThermos  
         –schemaAssembleThermos  
      –schemaMakeDrink  
      +schemaPackSnack  
         +schemaPickUpTheme Picking up cookie4Wrapped with leftHand 
         –schemaPickUpTheme  
         +schemaPack Packing lunchBoxLid with cookie4Wrapped held in leftHand 
         –schemaPack  
      –schemaPackSnack  
      +schemaPackDrink  
         +schemaPack Packing lunchBox with thermos held in rightHand 
         –schemaPack  
      –schemaPackDrink  
      +schemaMakeSandwich  
      ...  
      –schemaMakeSandwich  
      –schemaWrapSandwich  
      +schemaPackSandwich  
         +schemaPickUpTheme Picking up sandwichWrapped with leftHand 
         –schemaPickUpTheme  
         +schemaPack Packing lunchBox with sandwichWrapped held in leftHand 
         –schemaPack  
      –schemaPackSandwich  
      ...  
 
Figure 5: A lapse in action generated by the model when performing the lunch packing task. After 
correctly preparing the wrapped snack and the drink, the model picks up the wrapped cookie (while 
holding the thermos) and packs the wrapped cookie into the lunch box lid (an object substitution 
error). The thermos is then correctly packed into the lunch box. Later in the task, once the sandwich is 
made and wrapped, the wrapped sandwich is correctly packed into the lunch box. The lapse was 
generated with all parameters except noise at their default values. N, the standard deviation of 
normally distributed noise affecting all networks, was set at 0.04. 
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Figure 6: The error surface (left) and accomplishment surface (right) resulting from variation of Is 
(intrinsic/intentional excitation within the schema network) and ES (extrinsic/environmental excitation 
within the schema network). The model produces error-free behaviour when IS is moderate to high and 
ES is very low. 
 
 
Figure 7: The error surface (left) and accomplishment surface (right) resulting from variation of L 
(lateral inhibition throughout all networks) and S (self influence throughout all networks). The model 
produces error-free behaviour for a wide range of values of L when S is between 0.20 and 0.30. 
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Figure 8: The relative frequency of error types as a function of IS, the degree of top-down excitation 
within the schema network. ES, the degree of bottom-up excitation was simultaneously varied such 
that IS + ES = 0.600 as described in the text. (Thus, the horizontal axis could be relabelled with values 
of ES decreasing from left to right.) Each bar represents the mean standardised error scores of 100 
simulated participants in the distractor absent condition and 100 simulated participants in the distractor 
present condition. 
 
Figure 9: The error profiles of 30 simulated patients. Each bar represents one patient performing the 
lunch packing task under two conditions, distractors absent and distractors present, with Is ranging 
from 0.450 to 0.420. The data were generated from that used in Figure 8, sampled according to the 
procedure described in the text. 
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Figure 10: The relative frequency of error types as a function of NS, the degree of noise in the schema 
network. Each bar represents the mean standardised error scores of 100 simulated participants in the 
distractor absent condition and 100 simulated participants in the distractor present condition. 
 
 
Figure 11: The error profiles of 30 simulated patients. Each bar represents one patient performing the 
lunch packing task under two conditions, distractors absent and distractors present, with NS ranging 
from 0.060 to 0.170. The data were generated from that used in Figure 10, sampled according to the 
procedure described in the text. 
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Figure 12: The relative frequency of error types as a function of NO, the degree of noise in the object 
representation networks. Each bar represents the mean standardised error scores of 100 simulated 
participants in the distractor absent condition and 100 simulated participants in the distractor present 
condition. 
 
Figure 13: The error profiles of 30 simulated patients. Each bar represents one patient performing the 
lunch packing task under two conditions, distractors absent and distractors present, with NO ranging 
from 0.020 to 0.170. The data were generated from that used in Figure 12, sampled according to the 
procedure described in the text. 
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Appendix A: Schemas Used in the Model of the Lunch Packing Task 
Below is the complete set of schemas used in the model of the lunch packing task. All schemas are 
goal-directed (i.e., they achieve a goal).  
High-level Schemas 
High-level schemas are those that do not correspond directly to actions. Each high-level schema 
consists of a set of subgoals, and each subgoal has a pre-condition and post-condition. When selected, 
a high-level schema will excite nodes corresponding to schemas that achieve any of its subgoals, 
provided the pre-conditions of the subgoal are satisfied and the post-conditions are not satisfied. 
schemaMakeLunch achieves goalMakeLunch 
        Subgoal: goalMakeDrink; Pre: True;  Post: DrinkPrepared 
        Subgoal: goalPackDrink; Pre: DrinkPrepared;  Post: DrinkPacked 
        Subgoal: goalMakeSandwich; Pre: True;  Post: SandwichPrepared+TableTidy 
        Subgoal: goalWrapSandwich; Pre: SandwichPrepared;  Post: SandwichWrapped 
        Subgoal: goalPackSandwich; Pre: SandwichWrapped;  Post: SandwichPacked 
        Subgoal: goalWrapSnack; Pre: True;  Post: SnackWrapped 
        Subgoal: goalPackSnack; Pre: SnackWrapped;  Post: SnackPacked 
        Subgoal: goalCloseLunchbox; Pre: LunchPacked;  Post: LunchboxClosed 
 
schemaMakeDrink achieves goalMakeDrink 
        Subgoal: goalOpenSourceJar; Pre: True;  Post: OpenJuiceJarHeld 
        Subgoal: goalPourFromJar; Pre: JuiceJarOpen;  Post: FullThermosOnTable 
        Subgoal: goalCloseSourceJar; Pre: FullThermosOnTable;  Post: ThermosFull+JuiceJarClosed 
        Subgoal: goalAssembleThermos; Pre: ThermosFull+JuiceJarClosed;  Post: ThermosCapped 
 
schemaPourFromJar achieves goalPourFromJar 
        Subgoal: goalPickUpSource; Pre: True;  Post: OpenJuiceJarHeld 
        Subgoal: goalPour; Pre: OpenJuiceJarHeld;  Post: FullThermosOnTable 
 
schemaAssembleThermos achieves goalAssembleThermos 
        Subgoal: goalCloseThermos; Pre: True;  Post: ClosedThermosHeld 
        Subgoal: goalCapThermos; Pre: ClosedThermosHeld;  Post: CappedThermosHeld 
 
schemaCloseThermos achieves goalCloseThermos 
        Subgoal: goalPickUpTarget; Pre: True;  Post: OpenThermosHeld 
        Subgoal: goalPickUpTheme; Pre: True;  Post: LidHeld 
        Subgoal: goalClose; Pre: OpenThermosHeld;  Post: ClosedThermosHeld 
 
schemaCapThermos achieves goalCapThermos 
        Subgoal: goalPickUpTarget; Pre: True;  Post: ThermosHeld 
        Subgoal: goalPickUpTheme; Pre: True;  Post: CupHeld 
        Subgoal: goalCap; Pre: ThermosHeld;  Post: CappedThermosHeld 
 
schemaPackDrink achieves goalPackDrink 
        Subgoal: goalPickUpTheme; Pre: True;  Post: HoldCappedThermos 
        Subgoal: goalPack; Pre: ThermosHeld;  Post: ThermosPacked 
 
schemaMakeSandwich achieves goalMakeSandwich 
        Subgoal: goalGetBread; Pre: True;  Post: BreadSlicesDistinct 
        Subgoal: goalApplyLunchMeat; Pre: BreadSlicesDistinct;  Post: MeatOnBread 
        Subgoal: goalApplyMustard; Pre: BreadSlicesDistinct;  Post: SpreadDoneWith 
        Subgoal: goalApplyBread; Pre: Spread+MeatOnBread;  Post: SandwichPrepared 
        Subgoal: goalCloseBreadBag; Pre: BreadOnTable;  Post: BreadOnTable+BagClosed 
        Subgoal: goalCloseMeatPacket; Pre: MeatDoneWith;  Post: MeatDoneWith+BagClosed 
        Subgoal: goalCloseSpreadJar; Pre: SpreadDoneWith;  Post: SpreadDoneWith+JarClosed 
 
schemaCloseBreadBag achieves goalCloseBreadBag 
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        Subgoal: goalCloseSourceBag; Pre: True;  Post: SourceClosed 
 
schemaCloseMeatPacket achieves goalCloseMeatPacket 
        Subgoal: goalCloseSourceBag; Pre: True;  Post: SourceClosed 
 
schemaCloseSpreadJar achieves goalCloseSpreadJar 
        Subgoal: goalCloseSourceJar; Pre: True;  Post: SourceJarClosed 
 
schemaGetBread achieves goalGetBread 
        Subgoal: goalOpenSourceBag; Pre: True;  Post: BreadBagOpen 
        Subgoal: goalTransferBread; Pre: BreadBagOpen;  Post: BreadOnTable 
        Subgoal: goalChooseTargetSlice; Pre: BreadOnTable;  Post: SlicesDistinct 
 
schemaTransferBread achieves goalTransferBread 
        Subgoal: goalTakeTwoFrom; Pre: True;  Post: BreadHeld 
        Subgoal: goalPutDownTheme; Pre: BreadHeld;  Post: BreadOnTable 
 
schemaApplyMustard achieves goalApplyMustard 
        Subgoal: goalOpenSourceJar; Pre: True;  Post: OpenMustardJarHeld 
        Subgoal: goalSpreadMustard; Pre: OpenMustardJarHeld;  Post: SpreadOnBread 
 
schemaSpreadMustard achieves goalSpreadMustard 
        Subgoal: goalPickUpImplement; Pre: True;  Post: ImplementHeld 
        Subgoal: goalDip; Pre: ImplementHeld;  Post: SpreadOnImplement 
        Subgoal: goalSpread; Pre: SpreadOnImplement;  Post: SpreadOnBread 
 
schemaApplyLunchMeat achieves goalApplyLunchMeat 
        Subgoal: goalTakeFrom; Pre: True;  Post: MeatHeld 
        Subgoal: goalCover; Pre: MeatHeld;  Post: MeatOnBread 
 
schemaApplyBread achieves goalApplyBread 
        Subgoal: goalPickUpTheme; Pre: True;  Post: BreadHeld 
        Subgoal: goalCover; Pre: BreadHeld;  Post: BreadOnBread 
 
schemaWrapSandwich achieves goalWrapSandwich 
        Subgoal: goalGetFoil; Pre: True;  Post: WrapperOnTable 
        Subgoal: goalTransferSandwich; Pre: WrapperOnTable;  Post: SandwichOnOrInWrapper 
        Subgoal: goalWrap; Pre: SandwichOnWrapper;  Post: SandwichInWrapper 
 
schemaTransferSandwich achieves goalTransferSandwich 
        Subgoal: goalPickUpTheme; Pre: True;  Post: SandwichHeld 
        Subgoal: goalCover; Pre: SandwichHeld;  Post: SandwichOnWrapper 
 
schemaPackSandwich achieves goalPackSandwich 
        Subgoal: goalPickUpTheme; Pre: True;  Post: WrappedSandwichHeld 
        Subgoal: goalPack; Pre: WrappedSandwichHeld;  Post: WrappedSandwichPacked 
 
schemaWrapSnack achieves goalWrapSnack 
        Subgoal: goalGetFoil; Pre: True;  Post: WrapperOnTable 
        Subgoal: goalGetCookie; Pre: True;  Post: CookieIsPresent 
        Subgoal: goalWrapCookie; Pre: Cookie+WrapperArePresent; Post: CookieInWrapper 
        Subgoal: goalCloseSourceBag; Pre: CookieInWrapper;  Post: CookiePacketClosed 
 
schemaGetCookie achieves goalGetCookie 
        Subgoal: goalOpenSourceBag; Pre: True;  Post: CookiePacketOpen 
        Subgoal: goalTakeFrom; Pre: CookiePacketOpen;  Post: CookieHeld 
 
schemaWrapCookie achieves goalWrapCookie 
        Subgoal: goalPickUpTheme; Pre: True;  Post: CookieHeld 
        Subgoal: goalCover; Pre: CookieHeld;  Post: CookieOnWrapper 
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        Subgoal: goalWrap; Pre: CookieOnWrapper;  Post: CookieInWrapper 
 
schemaPackSnack achieves goalPackSnack 
        Subgoal: goalPickUpTheme; Pre: True;  Post: WrappedCookieHeld 
        Subgoal: goalPack; Pre: WrappedCookieHeld;  Post: WrappedCookiePacked 
 
schemaGetFoil achieves goalGetFoil 
        Subgoal: goalPickUpSource; Pre: True;  Post: RollHeld 
        Subgoal: goalTear; Pre: RollHeld;  Post: WrapperOnTable 
        Subgoal: goalPutDownSource; Pre: WrapperOnTable;  Post: FoilRoll+WrapperOnTable 
 
schemaOpenTarget achieves goalOpenTargetJar 
        Subgoal: goalPickUpTarget; Pre: True;  Post: RelevantTargetHeld 
        Subgoal: goalOpen; Pre: TargetJarHeld;  Post: OpenTargetJarHeld 
        Subgoal: goalPutDownTheme; Pre: OpenTargetJarHeld;  Post: LidNotHeld 
        Subgoal: goalPutDownTarget; Pre: True;  Post: NotIrrelevantSourceHeld 
 
schemaOpenSourceJar achieves goalOpenSourceJar 
        Subgoal: goalPutDownSource; Pre: True;  Post: NotIrrelevantSourceHeld 
        Subgoal: goalPickUpSource; Pre: True;  Post: RelevantSourceHeld 
        Subgoal: goalOpen; Pre: SourceJarHeld;  Post: OpenSourceJarHeld 
        Subgoal: goalPutDownTheme; Pre: OpenSourceJarHeld;  Post: LidNotHeld 
 
schemaCloseSourceJar achieves goalCloseSourceJar 
        Subgoal: goalPutDownSource; Pre: True;  Post: NotIrrelevantSourceHeld 
        Subgoal: goalPickUpSource; Pre: True;  Post: RelevantSourceHeld 
        Subgoal: goalPickUpTheme; Pre: True;  Post: LidHeld 
        Subgoal: goalClose; Pre: SourceJar+LidHeld;  Post: ClosedSourceJarHeld 
 
schemaOpenSourceBag achieves goalOpenSourceBag 
        Subgoal: goalPutDownSource; Pre: True;  Post: NotIrrelevantSourceHeld 
        Subgoal: goalPickUpSource; Pre: True;  Post: RelevantSourceHeld 
        Subgoal: goalOpen; Pre: SourceBagHeld;  Post: OpenSourceBagHeld 
 
schemaCloseSourceBag achieves goalCloseSourceBag 
        Subgoal: goalPutDownSource; Pre: True;  Post: NotIrrelevantSourceHeld 
        Subgoal: goalPickUpSource; Pre: True;  Post: RelevantSourceHeld 
        Subgoal: goalClose; Pre: OpenSourceBagHeld;  Post: SourceBagClosed 
 
Basic-level Schemas 
Basic-level schemas correspond directly to actions. They have no subgoals. When selected, basic-level 
schemas trigger execution of their actions.  
schemaPickUpSource achieves goalPickUpSource 
schemaPickUpTarget achieves goalPickUpTarget 
schemaPickUpImplement achieves goalPickUpImplement 
schemaPickUpTheme achieves goalPickUpTheme 
schemaPutDownSource achieves goalPutDownSource 
schemaPutDownTarget achieves goalPutDownTarget 
schemaPutDownImplement achieves goalPutDownImplement 
schemaPutDownTheme achieves goalPutDownTheme 
schemaScrewOpen achieves goalOpen 
schemaUnseal achieves goalOpen 
schemaScrewClosed achieves goalClose 
schemaSeal achieves goalClose 
schemaCap achieves goalCap 
schemaTakeFrom achieves goalTakeFrom 
schemaTakeTwoFrom achieves goalTakeTwoFrom 
schemaChooseTargetSlice achieves goalChooseTargetSlice 
schemaPour achieves goalPour 
Simulating Action Disorganisation 
 41
schemaDip achieves goalDip 
schemaSpread achieves goalSpread 
schemaTear achieves goalTear 
schemaCover achieves goalCover 
schemaWrap achieves goalWrap 
schemaPack achieves goalPack 
schemaCloseLid achieves goalCloseLunchbox 
 
Task-Irrelevant Schemas 
The model also includes several basic-level schemas that are not needed for completion of the task. 
These schemas should never be selected under normal operation, but are included to allow the 
possibility of task-irrelevant behaviour. 
schemaSwap achieves goalSwapHands 
schemaOpenLid achieves goalOpenLunchbox 
schemaFold achieves goalFold 
schemaFlip achieves goalFlip 
schemaPoke achieves goalPoke 
schemaEat achieves goalEat 
schemaDrink achieves goalDrink 
 
Appendix B: Objects Used in the Model of the Lunch Packing Task 
All simulations included representations of all basic objects in the object representation networks. 
Simulations of behaviour with distractors also included representations of the distractor objects as 
given below. 
Basic objects and their features 
breadBag: IS_BAG | IS_MEDIUM 
    State: Closed 
    Contents: 
        bread0: IS_EDIBLE | IS_SLICED | IS_SQUARE | IS_MEDIUM 
        bread1: IS_EDIBLE | IS_SLICED | IS_SQUARE | IS_MEDIUM 
        bread2: IS_EDIBLE | IS_SLICED | IS_SQUARE | IS_MEDIUM 
        bread3: IS_EDIBLE | IS_SLICED | IS_SQUARE | IS_MEDIUM 
        bread4: IS_EDIBLE | IS_SLICED | IS_SQUARE | IS_MEDIUM 
cookiePacket: IS_BAG | IS_SMALL, STATE_CLOSED 
    Contents: 
        cookie0: IS_EDIBLE | IS_SMALL | IS_DISK 
        cookie1: IS_EDIBLE | IS_SMALL | IS_DISK 
        cookie2: IS_EDIBLE | IS_SMALL | IS_DISK 
        cookie3: IS_EDIBLE | IS_SMALL | IS_DISK 
        cookie4: IS_EDIBLE | IS_SMALL | IS_DISK 
foilRoll: IS_ROLL | IS_CYLINDRICAL 
foil: IS_WRAPPER | IS_FLAT | IS_SILVER 
    Covers foilRoll 
juiceJar: IS_CUP | IS_SCREWABLE | IS_SIZE2 
    State: Closed 
    Contents: 
        juice: IS_FLUID 
juiceJarLid: IS_LID | IS_DISK | IS_SIZE2 | FITS_JAR 
    Covers juiceJar 
knife: IS_EXTENDED | IS_TOOL | IS_SHARP 
lunchBox: IS_TIN | IS_LARGE | HAS_LID | IS_SQUARE 
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    State: Open 
lunchBoxLid: IS_TIN | IS_LID | IS_LARGE | IS_SQUARE 
    Attached to lunchBox 
lunchMeatPacket: IS_BAG | IS_MEAT_PACKET 
    State: Open 
    Contents: 
        lunchMeat0: IS_EDIBLE | IS_SLICED | IS_SQUARE | IS_MEDIUM | IS_SANDWICH_FILLING 
        lunchMeat1: IS_EDIBLE | IS_SLICED | IS_SQUARE | IS_MEDIUM | IS_SANDWICH_FILLING 
        lunchMeat2: IS_EDIBLE | IS_SLICED | IS_SQUARE | IS_MEDIUM | IS_SANDWICH_FILLING 
        lunchMeat3: IS_EDIBLE | IS_SLICED | IS_SQUARE | IS_MEDIUM | IS_SANDWICH_FILLING 
        lunchMeat4: IS_EDIBLE | IS_SLICED | IS_SQUARE | IS_MEDIUM | IS_SANDWICH_FILLING 
mustardJar: IS_CUP | IS_SCREWABLE | IS_SIZE1 
    State: Closed 
    Contents: 
        mustard: IS_CONDIMENT | IS_EDIBLE 
mustardJarLid: IS_LID | IS_SIZE1 | IS_DISK | FITS_JAR 
    Covers mustardJar 
thermos: IS_CYLINDRICAL | IS_CUP | IS_SCREWABLE | IS_SIZE4 
    State: Open 
thermosLid: IS_LID | IS_SIZE4 | IS_DISK | FITS_THERMOS 
thermosCup: IS_CUP | FITS_THERMOS 
 
Distractor objects and their features 
appleSauceJar: IS_CUP | IS_SCREWABLE | IS_SIZE3 
    State: Closed 
    Contents: 
        appleSauce: IS_CONDIMENT | IS_FLUID 
appleSauceJarLid: IS_LID | IS_SIZE3 | IS_DISK | FITS_JAR 
    Covers appleSauceJar 
glass: IS_CYLINDRICAL | IS_CUP 
    State: Open 
hotDogPacket: IS_BAG | IS_MEAT_PACKET 
    State: Closed 
    Contains: 
        hotDog0: IS_EDIBLE | IS_MEDIUM 
        hotDog1: IS_EDIBLE | IS_MEDIUM 
        hotDog2: IS_EDIBLE | IS_MEDIUM 
        hotDog3: IS_EDIBLE | IS_MEDIUM 
        hotDog4: IS_EDIBLE | IS_MEDIUM 
paperTowelRoll: IS_ROLL | IS_CYLINDRICAL 
paperTowel: IS_WRAPPER | IS_FLAT 
    Covers paperTowelRoll 
schoolBag: IS_BAG | IS_LARGE 
    State: Open 
spatula: IS_EXTENDED | IS_TOOL 
 
Appendix C: Relation of the Revised Model to that of Cooper & Shallice (2000) 
Cooper & Shallice (2000) specified the original interactive activation model of routine action selection 
in terms of 11 central assumptions, 15 peripheral assumptions, 7 implementational assumptions and a 
set of equations governing the updating of activations (equivalent to an eighth implementation 
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assumption). The equations governing the update of activations still hold in the extended model, as do 
the majority of the assumptions. Table 3 shows those assumptions that have changed.  
Table 3: Assumptions that differ between the original model of Cooper & Shallice (2000) 
and the model presented here. 
Assumption of original model Revised assumption for extended model 
CA2: Schemas consist of a partially ordered set of 
subgoals 
CA2’: Schemas consist of a set of subgoals, 
where each subgoal has an associated pre-
condition and post-condition. (Pre-conditions 
impose an implicit partial ordering on subgoals. 
Post-conditions allow for optional subgoals.) 
CA11: Discrete actions, which correspond to 
basic-level schemas, specify selection restrictions 
on the objects and resources to which they may 
be applied. 
CA11’: Discrete actions, which correspond to 
basic-level schemas, specify the functional role of 
the objects and the state of resources/effectors to 
which they may be applied.  
PA1: Schemas compete if they are alternate 
means of achieving the same goal or if they share 
one or more subgoals. This competition is 
effected by a “lateral influence” on the activations 
of competing schemas. 
PA1’: Schemas compete if and only if they share 
one or more component schemas and neither is a 
subcomponent of the other. This competition is 
effected by a “lateral influence” on the activations 
of competing schemas. 
PA5: When all subgoals of a selected schema 
have been achieved, the schema is inhibited. This 
inhibition remains in force as long as the schema 
is selected. 
PA5’: When all subgoals of a selected schema 
have either been achieved or have their post-
conditions satisfied, the schema is inhibited. This 
inhibition remains in force as long as the schema 
is selected. 
PA7: The top-down influence on component 
schemas by selected source schemas is gated by 
goal precondition achievement. That is, top-down 
excitation only flows to schemas whose goal has 
not been achieved but whose pre-condition has 
been achieved. 
PA7’: The top-down influence on component 
schemas by selected source schemas is gated by 
goal pre-condition and post-condition 
achievement. That is, top-down excitation only 
flows to schemas whose goal has not been 
achieved but whose pre-condition has been 
achieved and whose post-condition has not been 
achieved 
PA12: Objects and resources are allocated to the 
arguments roles of discrete actions according to 
selection restrictions marked on the argument 
roles of the action and the activation of nodes in 
the object representation and resource networks. 
PA12’: Objects are allocated to the unbound 
arguments roles of discrete actions according to 
the functional role specifications marked on the 
argument roles of the action and the activation of 
nodes in the object representation networks. 
Resources are allocated to the argument roles of 
discrete actions according to the state 
requirements marked on the argument roles of the 
action and the activation of nodes in the resource 
network. 
IA2: The degree of lateral influence of schema A 
on schema B (assuming A and B compete) is 
proportional to the difference between schema 
A’s activation and rest activation. The total lateral 
influence on a schema is the sum of the lateral 
influences from all of its competitors. 
IA2’: The degree of lateral influence of schema A 
on schema B (assuming A and B compete) is 
proportional to the difference between schema 
A’s activation and rest activation. The total lateral 
influence on a schema is the mean of the lateral 
influences from all of its competitors. 
 
Several additional assumptions relate to object binding. Object binding is a central aspect of the 
theory, though the unbinding mechanism may be implemented in several different ways. In addition to 
the original 33 assumptions and the above revisions, the revised model therefore has two additional 
central assumptions and one additional implementation assumption:  
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CA12: Schemas may bind objects to one or more functional roles. If a schema binds a functional role, 
then the first action attempted while the schema is selected that uses an object in that functional role 
binds the object that is most active for that role to the role. The object remains bound in that role until 
its activation falls to below that of some other object within the same functional role. It is then 
unbound. 
 
CA13: If, when an action is executed, one of its argument roles is bound, then the action applies to the 
object to which the argument role is bound, regardless of activity in the relevant object representation 
network. 
 
IA8: When a schema that binds an object is deselected, the object representation is inhibited until the 
object is unbound. 
 
Table 4 shows the values of all parameters in the original and extended model. The use of increased 
persistence and decreased self influence in the revised model reflects the use of a smaller effective 
time internal between activation updates. The increased level of lateral inhibition is necessary because 
the lateral inhibition on a node in the revised model is the mean, rather than the sum, of lateral 
inhibition from competing nodes. At the same time schema and object representation influences are 
biased in the revised model slightly more towards non-competitive sources and away from self 
influence and lateral inhibition. The use of inhibition on deselection within the object representation 
network means that it is also possible to give more weight to extrinsic influences in the object 
representation network (i.e., schema to object representation influences). 
Table 4: Default parameter values for the original and extended model 
Parameter Original default value Revised default value 
Rest activation 0.10 0.10 
Selection threshold 0.60 0.60 
Persistence 0.80 0.87 
Noise (standard deviation) 0.001 0.01 
Self influence SS = 0.30; SO = 0.30; SE = 0.00 SS = 0.23; SO = 0.23; SE = 0.23 
Lateral influence LS = 0.30; LO = 0.30; LE = 0.00 LS = 0.46; LO = 0.46; LE = 0.46 
Intrinsic / Internal IS = 0.32; IO = 0.00; IE = 0.00 IS = 0.50; IO = 0.00; IE = 0.00 
Extrinsic / External ES = 0.08; EO = 0.04; EE = 1.00 ES = 0.10; EO = 0.40; EE = 0.40 
  
